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PSYCHOSURGERY AND THE INVOLUNTARILY CONFINED
Men ought to know that from the brain and from the brain only
arise our pleasures, joys, laughter, and jests as well as our sorrows,
pains, griefs and tears. Through it, in particular, we think, see,
hear, and distinguish the ugly from the beautiful, the bad from the
good, the pleasant from the unpleasant .... It is the same thing
which makes us mad or delirious, inspires us with dread and fear,
whether by night or by day, brings sleeplessness, inopportune mis-
takes, aimless anxieties, absentmindedness, and acts contrary to
habit.
Hippocrates
The Sacred Disease 1
I. INTRODUCTION
During its developmental stages, 2 and throughout the fifties and sixties,
the legal issues involved in the performance of psychosurgery 3 were largely
ignored by the legal community.4 The development of scientifically refined
techniques for psychosurgery, 5 however, coincided with the climate of gen-
eral political unrest in the late 1960's. 6 This climate, evidenced in part by a
general fear of behavior control and a concern about the possible abuse of
minorities, 7 provided the background against which a growing public con-
cern about the uses of psychosurgery arose. 8 Dr. Peter Breggin, a psychia-
trist, wrote a series of articles that criticized the increased incidence of
psychosurgery 9 and the political implications of suggestions that urban riots
and other acts of "senseless violence" might be prevented, at least in part,
by appropriate diagnostic techniques and surgical intervention.' 0 The popu-
1. HIPPOCRATES, COLLECTED WORKS 175 (W. Jones trans. 1923).
2. For a discussion of the early history and development of psychosurgery, see notes 26-50
and accompanying text infra.
3. For a definition of "psychosurgery" and a discussion of the issues and problems involved
in defining psychosurgery, see notes 16-25 and accompanying text infra.
4. Annas & Glantz, Psychosurgery: The Law's Response, 54 B.U.L. REV. 249, 251 (1974).
5. For a discussion of the more contemporary psychosurgical procedures, see note 18 infra.
6. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, PSYCHOSURGERY: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (1977)
(Sup. Doc. No. Y3.H88:2P95) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
7. Id.
8. id.
9. Breggin, The Return of Lobotomy and Psychosurgery, reprinted in 118 CONG. REC.
5567 (1972). See also Breggin, Lobotomy Is Still Bad Medicine, MEDICAL OPINION, March
1972, at 32.
10. Breggin, Psychosurgery for the Control of Violence-Including a Critical Examination
of the Work of Vernon Mark and Frank Ervin, reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 11,396 (1972),
(949)
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lar novels A Clockwork Orange,1 1 One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, 12 and
The Terminal Man 13 contributed to a growing public awareness, as did re-
ports that psychosurgery had been performed on prisoners in California.
14
Reacting to this widespread public concern, the legal community formu-
lated a tentative response to the issues raised by the performance of
psychosurgical procedures. Due to the emotional nature of the issues, that
initial response was, in some cases, an overreaction to the problem.
15
Gradually, however, a more reasoned approach to the use of psychosurgery
has been formulated. This comment will focus on the adequacy of the law's
response to psychosurgery, with specific reference to the performance of
psychosurgery on two distinct classes of individuals: the involuntarily con-
fined mental patient and the prison inmate. In evaluating the legal response
to psychosurgery, particular emphasis will be placed on the constitutional
analysis involved to determine the extent to which the various regulatory
approaches have preserved the individual's physical and mental integrity,
the physician's ability to pursue his vocation of medical practice and re-
search, and the future patient's access to the potential benefits of contem-
porary psychosurgical research.
rewritten and republished in NEURAL BASES OF VIOLENCE AND AGGRESSION (W. Fields & W.
Sweet ed. 1975).
The proposal that acts of violence could be prevented by psychosurgery was first made by
Drs. Ervin, Mark, and Sweet in a letter which linked "arson, sniping and physical assault" to
"brain dysfunction." Ervin, Mark & Sweet, Role of Brain Disease in Riots and Urban Violence,
201 J.A.M.A. 895 (1967). The authors called for an extensive screening of Americans to discover
and treat potentially violent individuals. Id. See also V. MARK & F. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE
BRAIN (1970).
11. A. BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962).
12. K. KESEY, ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST (1962).
13. M. CICHTON, THE TERMINAL MAN (1972). This story dealt with the control of tem-
poral lobe epilepsy through computer controlled electrical stimulation of the brain (ESB). Id.
14. Aarons, Brain Surgery is Tested on 3 California Convicts, Wash. Post. Feb. 25, 1972,
§ A, at 1, col. 7. The article stated in part:
A California prison hospital has experimented with brain surgery to control violent,
aggressive spasms of inmates it described as "brain damaged."
Three inmates with a history of episodic seizures of uncontrollable violence,
apparently caused by brain damage, had portions of their amygdalas destroyed by a rela-
tively new and sophisticated technique known as stereotaxic surgery.
According to prison officials, all three inmates-in their lucid moments-granted con-
sent to the operations, as did members of their families. (This could not be verified, since
access to medical records was denied.) Furthermore, according to L.J. Pope, a retired
Navy doctor who is superintendent of Vacaville, the subjects were quite anxious to be
helped.
Id.
These general issues also received wide exposure in articles appearing in a number of
popular magazines. See, e.g., Mason, New Threat to Blacks: Brain Surgery to Control Be-
havior, EBONY, Feb. 1973, at 62; TIME, April 3, 1972, at 50.
15. For example, in 1973, Congressman Louis Stokes introduced legislation that would have
prohibited all forms of psychosurgery designed to alter behavior from being performed in feder-









As widespread disagreement over the safety and effectiveness of
psychosurgery exists, 16 a precise definition of the actual procedure remains
illusive. Proponents of psychosurgical operations sharply distinguish classic
frontal lobe surgery' 7 from the more technologically refined contemporary
16. A central issue surrounding the practice of psychosurgery has been the underlying
medical justification for the procedure. REPORT, supra note 6, at 7. A survey of the literature
would appear to indicate that psychosurgery has met with considerable therapeutic success.
Neurotic patients have benefited from the performance of psychosurgery. Restak, The Promise
and Peril of Psychosurgery, SAT. REV. WORLD, Sept. 25, 1973, at 54. Substantial success has
also been reported in the treatment of obsessive-compulsive neurosis, a disorder often charac-
terized by a constant fixation on a single object or activity. Bridges, Goktepe & Maratos, A
Comparative Review of Patients with Obsessional Neurosis and with Depression Treated by
Psychosurgery, 123 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 663, 664, 673 (1973); Tan, Marks & Marset, Bimedial
Leucotomy in Obsessive-Compulsive Neurosis: A Controlled Serial Inquiry, 118 BRIT. J. PSYCH.
155, 163 (1971). Certain operations have enabled previously institutionalized patients to return
to their families and resume partial or full employment. Str6m-Olsen & Carlisle, Bi-Frontal
Stereotactic Tractotomy, 118 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 141 (1971). Moreover, psychosurgery has pro-
vided a substantial benefit to patients suffering from intractable pain, whether caused by un-
known psychological factors or by untreatable physical disease. Roberts & Vilinskas, Control of
Pain Associated with Malignant Disease by Freezing: Cryoleucotomy, 37 CONN. MED. 184
(1973); Selker & Jannetta, Central Pain and Central Therapy of Pain, CURRENT PROB.
SURGERY, Feb. 1973, at 59. More modest claims have been asserted concerning the effective-
ness of psychosurgery in the treatment of schizophrenic patients. Templer, The Efficacy of
Psychosurgery, 9 BIOLOGICAL PSYCH. 205, 206-08 (1974).
In contrast, other medical experts assert that the risks of psychosurgery are unreasonably
high, noting the irreversibility of the procedure and the inconclusive and contradictory data
regarding the effects of psychosurgery, particularly upon "violent" patients. Chorover,
Psychosurgery: A Neuropsychological Perspective, 54 B.U. L. REV. 231, 239-45, 247-48 (1974).
In addition, since most psychosurgery is performed in the context of clinical practice, and is
therefore without a research protocol or any form of review, few attempts have been made to
systematically measure the patient's preoperative status against his post-operative condition.
Furthermore, subsequent evaluations are rarely performed by persons who have no vested in-
terest in the outcome of the surgery. E. VALENSTEIN, BRAIN CONTROL 296 (1973). See also
Mearns, Law and the Physical Control of the Mind: Experimentation In Psychosurgery, 25
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 565, 599-600 (1975). Furthermore, a significant number of studies are
conducted without proper research controls, which would permit the researcher to measure the
effects of the surgery compared against the effects of other forms of treatment, or no treatment.
Breggin, The Return of Lobotomy and Psychosurgery, reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 5567, 5575
(1972); Templer, supra, at 206-07. Another criticism involves the application of techniques to
humans by surgeons who have neither full knowledge nor appreciation of the complexity and
implications of the results of animal research. E. VALENSTEIN, supra, at 326-55. Valenstein, for
example, reports that incisions in the limbic system in animals produce unreliable and unpre-
dictable results, often either increasing aggression or producing marked abnormalities in be-
havior. Id. at 137. See also Chorover, supra, at 238.
17. The classic prefrontal lobotomy or leucotomv is accomplished by severing certain fiber
tracts running between the two frontal lobes and the rest of the brain with a special knife, the
leucotome, which is inserted through a small opening drilled in the skull. Goldstein, Prefrontal
Lobotomy: Analysis and Warning, 182 SCIENTIFIC AM., Feb. 1950, at 44. For a discussion of
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procedures. I A typical definition of contemporary psychosurgery is "any
neurosurgical operation that affects human behavior, even if the patients
being treated have obvious brain disease." 19 Definitions of psychosurgery
offered by critics of the procedure contain similar factual elements, but in-
clude words with a strikingly different emotional emphasis:
Psychosurgery is any surgery which mutilates or destroys brain
tissue to control the emotions or behavior without treating a known
brain disease. . . . [P]sychosurgery is a pacifying operation which
blunts the emotions and subdues behavior regardless of the pres-
ence or absence of any brain disease or any particular psychiatric
problem. It is simply a mutilating operation whose effect is to de-
stroy the individual's ability to respond emotionally. 2"
In 1974, the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (Commission) was established 2 1 to
investigate past uses of psychosurgery and to recommend to the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare "policies defining the circumstances (if any)
under which the use of psychosurgery may be appropriate." 2 2 Psychosurgery
was defined in the Commission's report 23 as follows:
18. The stereotaxic method of psychosurgery, which is considerably more exact and sophisti-
cated than the lobotomy, allows the placement of needle sized electrodes deep inside specific
regions of the brain, which are then used to stimulate or destroy certain portions of brain tissue.
Chorover, supra, note 16, at 235-37; Kelly, Richardson & Mitchell-Heggs, Stereotactic Limbic
Leucotomy: Neurophysiological Aspects and Operative Technique, 123 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 133,
137-38 (1973). For a discussion of this form of surgery and photographs of the tools and
techniques used, see V. MARK & F. ERVIN, supra note 10, at 71-85.
19. Mark, Psychosurgery Versus Anti-Psychiatry, 54 B.U.L. REV. 217, 218 (1974).
20. Breggin, supra note 10, at 11,396-97. Breggin, one of this country's most vocal oppo-
nents of psychosurgery, has characterized psychosurgery as no more "a medical procedure ...
than the mutilation of an arm as punishment for a crime is a medical procedure.'" Hearings on
S. 974, S. 878 and S.J. Res. 71 Before the Subcomnn. on Health of the Senate Comnmn. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 359 (1973) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.L11/2:H34/32/973) (re-
marks of Dr. Peter Breggin [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. This definition has legal implications
because neither individuals nor their legal guardians may consent to a procedure that may be
considered a mutilation. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENG-
LAND *205; Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 268 (1962). Although the ancient rationale for this rule cen-
tered on the king's right to aid his subjects, its modern justification is grounded upon the state's
interest in maintaining the health of its citizens. Annas & Glantz, supra note 4, at 255-56. See
State v. Bass, 255 N.C. 42, 46-47, 120 S.E.2d 580, 583 (1961) (doctor convicted as accessory
before the fact to crime of mayhem for anesthetizing fingers of individual who desired to have
them amputated in order to collect insurance proceeds). The analogy between psychosurgery
and mutilation of mayhem, however, has rarely been made in a legal context. Kidd, Limits of
the Right of a Person to Consent to Experimentation on Himself, 117 SCIENCE 211, 212 (1953);
Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REV. 99, 116 (1967).
21. National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 342, 348 (1974).
22. Id. § 202(c), 88 Stat. at 350. The Commission published the results of its investigation in
1977. REPORT, supra note 6. The Commission's report was also published in the Federal Regis-
ter. 42 Fed. Reg. 26,318 (1977).
23. REPORT, supra note 6.
[VOL. 24: p. 949
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The term "psychosurgery," ... means (except as stated be-
low): brain surgery, implantation of electrodes, destruction or di-
rect stimulation of brain tissue by any means (e.g., ultra-sound,
laser beams), or the direct application of substances to the brain
when any of these procedures is performed either (1) on normal
brain tissue of a person, for the purpose of changing or controlling
the behavior or emotions of such person, or (2) on diseased brain
tissue of a person, if the primary purpose of performing the proce-
dure is to control, change, or affect any behavioral or emotional
disturbance of such person. Such term does not include (a) electric
shock treatments, (b) surgery or other invasions of the brain de-
signed to cure or ameliorate the effects of movement disorders
(e.g., epilepsy, parkinsonism), and (c) excision of brain tumors.
With respect to the relief of pain, surgical or other invasions of the
brain which interrupt the transmission of pain along sensory path-
ways are not within the definition of psychosurgery; however,
when such procedures are designed to relieve the emotional re-
sponse to pain (without affecting the sensation of pain) they fall
within the definition of psychosurgery. 24
In summary, the generic definition of "psychosurgery," agreed upon by
those who favor, oppose, or are "morally neutral" to it appears to be: any
procedure involving the physical manipulation of the brain for the primary
purpose of specific behavior modification. 25
24. Id. at 57. Psychosurgery was defined in the Commission's enabling legislation as
brain surgery on (1) normal brain tissue of an individual who does not suffer from any
physical disease, for the purpose of changing or controlling the behavior or emotions of
such individual, or (2) diseased brain tissue of an individual, if the sole object of the
performance of such surgery is to control, change, or affect any behavioral or emotional
disturbance of such individual. Such term does not include brain surgery designed to cure
or ameliorate the effects of epilepsy and electric shock treatments.
National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348 § 202(c), 88 Stat. 342, 350 (1974). The Commission
amended this statutory definition by: 1) replacing the word "sole" with "primary;" 2) including
techniques other than surgical procedures-such as the implantation of electrodes, destruction
or direct stimulation of brain tissue by any means (e.g., ultra-sound or laser beams), and the
direct application of substances to the brain-when the primary purpose of such procedures is
to change or control behavior or emotions; and 3) expanding the types of procedures excluded
from the definition to include: a) surgery to relieve motor disorders (e.g., parkinsonism and
other disorders as well as epilepsy); b) surgery to remove tumors; and c) surgery to alleviate
pain (but excepting, however, procedures designed to modify the emotional response to persis-
tent pain without affecting the transmission of pain). REPORT, supra note 6, at xvi-xvii.
25. See also Note, Psychosurgery: The Rights of Patients, 23 Loy. L. REV. 1007, 1009
(1977); See also Annas & Glantz, supra note 4, at 249.
COMMENT
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B. A Brief History of Psychosurgery
The first procedure 26 fitting the generic definition of "psychosurgery" 27
was performed by Dr. Gottlieb Burckhardt in 1891.28 Burckhardt had at-
tempted to calm excitable patients by destroying a strip of cerebral cor-
tex. 29  Notwithstanding his belief that some patients had improved,
3 0
Burckhardt was forced to discontinue the operations due to vigorous opposi-
tion 3 1 by the medical community.
The widespread adoption of psychosurgery 32 is generally attributed to
the development of the classic prefrontal lobotomy 33 by Dr. Egas Moniz, a
Portuguese neuropsychiatrist. 34  In 1935, after hearing a report of the cahn-
ing effect of frontal lobe removal on monkeys and chimpanzees, 35 Moniz
operated on certain patients who had allegedly proven unresponsive to other
26. Modern psychosurgical techniques did not develop until the late nineteenth century.
See notes 28-31 and accompanying text infra. The practice of psychosurgery, however, report-
edh, traces to "trephining," a primitive method of opening the skull performed by the Incas
over 12,000 years ago, probably with the expectation of releasing demons. Note, Beyond the
"Cuckoo's Nest": A Proposal for Federal Regulation of Psychosurgery, 12 HARV. J. LEGIs. 610,
612 (1975). See also Flor-Henry, Psychiatric Surgery-1935-1973: Evolution and Current
Perspectives, 20 CAN. PSYCH, A.J. 157, 157 (1975); TIME, supra note 14, at 50. Ancient Roman
writings contain later references to the relief given to the insane through sword wounds to the
head. Restak, supra note 16, at 54-55. See also Note, supra, at 612. The development of
psychosurgery can also be traced to the eighteenth century science of phrenology, which was
based on the theory that the many aspects of human behavior could be reduced to an enumera-
ble set of "faculties," "functions" or "powers of the mind," each of which could be localized
within the brain. Chorover, supra note 16, at 232. The phrenologists produced detailed sche-
matic diagrams and argued that individual differences among people could be correlated with
differences in the relative degree of development of particular parts of the brain. Id. See gener-
ally J. DAVIES, PHRENOLOGY, FAD AND SCIENCE: A 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN CRUSADE
(1955).
27. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
28. E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 266-68.
29. 1d., discussing Burckhardt, Uber Rindenexcisionen, als Beitrag zur operativen Therapie
der Psychosen, 47 ALLO. ZISCHR. PSYCHIAT. 463 (1891).
30. E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 268. Burckhardt operated on six patients, one of
whom died as a result of the operation. Id. Although the survivors continued to exhibit psy-
chotic symptoms, they were described by Burckhardt as being more peaceful and easier to man-
age. Id.
31. REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. See also E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 268.
32. See notes 39 & 41-42 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the nature of
psychosurgical procedures currently being performed in the United States, see notes 53-57 and
accompanying text infra.
33. For a discussion of the classic prefrontal lobotomy, see note 17 supra.
34. REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. See THE AGE OF MADNESS 157 (T. Szasz ed. 1973), reprint-
ing in part Moniz, How I Caine to Perform Prefrontal Leucotonmy, in CONGRESS OF
PSYCHOSURGERY 7 (1948).
35. Fulton & Jacobsen, The Functions of the Frontal Lobes, A Comparative Study in Mon-
keys, Chimpanzees and Man, 4 ADVANCES MOD. BIOLOGY 113 (1935); Jacobsen, Studies on
Cerebral Function in Primates, 13 COMP. PSYCHl. MONOGRAPHS 3 (1936). Early research by
Drs. Jacobsen and Fulton catalogued the disappearance of frustration, temper tantrums, and
anxiety toward learning tasks following frontal cortex ablation in two chimpanzees. Fulton &
Jacobsen, supra; Jacobsen, supra.
VOL. 24: p. 949
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forms of treatment.3 6  Moniz' monograph,3 7 describing the generally favor-
able results obtained on his first twenty patients, 38 encouraged other neuro-
psychiatrists and neurosurgeons to adopt similar procedures.
39
Frontal lobe surgery was introduced into the United States in 1936 by
Drs. Walter Freeman, a neurologist, and James Watts, a neurosurgeon, of
George Washington University. 40  The popularity of the procedure gradually
increased, and over the next twenty-five years approximately 50,000 prefron-
tal lobotomies were performed in the United States. 4 ' The majority of
these operations were performed between 1945 and 1955.42 During this
period, the urgent need for the efficient treatment of the many psychologi-
call), disturbed veterans of World War 11,43 combined with the optimistic
reports of the results of the procedures," resulted in a wide scale adoption
of frontal lobe surgery.45 By the end of the fifties, however, the psychiatric
36. Chorover, supra note 16, at 234. Moniz initially used injections of alcohol to coagulate
certain fiber tracts running between the frontal lobes and other parts of the brain. Id. This
technique, however, was abandoned in favor of what came to be known as the classic prefrontal
lobotomy or leucotomy. Id. For a description of this procedure, see note 17 supra.
37. Moniz, Les Premieres Tentatives Operatoires dans le Traitement de Certaines Psychoses,
91 L'ENCEPHALE 1 (1936).
38. THE AGE OF MADNESS, supra note 34, at 158-60. During a 10-week period beginning in
November 1935, Moniz performed a total of 20 operations. Chorover, supra note 16, at 234.
Moniz claimed that seven of the patients had been "cured" by the surgery and that another
eight, who had previously been violent and agitated, became calm, tractable, and generally
easier to manage. THE AGE OF MADNESS, supra note 34, at 158. See also Edson, The Psyche
and the Surgeon, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 14, 78. Intelligence and
memory were preserved, although complications in sphincter disturbances, sluggish pupils,
apathy, loss of initiative, and disorientation were observed. Greenblatt & Myerson,
Psychosurgery, 240 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1006, 1014-15 (1949).
39. REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. In the 15 years following the initial work of Moniz, more
than 100,000 lobotomies were performed worldwide. Hearings, supra note 20, at 340 (testimony
of Dr. Bertram Brown).
40. Annas & Glantz, supra note 4, at 250. See Freeman, Frontal Lobotomy in Early
Schizophrenia Long Follow-up in 415 Cases, 119 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 621, 621 (1971). See generally
W. FREEMAN & J. WATTS, PSYCHOSURGERY (2d ed. 1950).
41. Hearings, supra note 20 at 340 (testimony of Dr. Bertram Brown). The procedure be-
came so popular that prefrontal lobotomies were being performed not only on continuously
hospitalized psychotic patients, but also on nonhospitalized neurotics and individuals with
psychosomatic complaints. Chorover, supra note 16, at 234; Chorover, The Pacification of the
Brain, 7 PSYCH. TODAY, May 1974, at 59-60. Dr. Freeman indicated that he alone had been
personally involved with lobotomies performed on more than 3,500 individuals during his
career. Freeman, supra note 40, at 622. See also Restak, supra note 16, at 56.
42. REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
43. Id. See also Psychosurgery in Veterans Administration Hospitals: Joint Hearings on an
Examination of Psychosurgery at Veterans' Administration Hospitals for the Purpose of Be-
havior Modification Before the Subconmn. on Health of the Senate Comm. of Labor and Public
Welfare and the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
7-8 (1973) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.Ll1/2:P95/2) (statement of Donald E. Johnson) [hereinafter cited
as Veterans Hearings].
44. It was reported, for example, that schizophrenic patients who had been habitually hos-
pitalized and who were irritable and helpless became "quiet, more cooperative, clean, able to
eat by themselves, capable of working in the hospital, and could even be sent home to their
families." Goldstein, supra note 17, at 44.
45. E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 55, 390 n.7. See also Veterans Hearings, supra note
43, at 7-8.
7
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community had substantially lost its enthusiasm for the prefrontal
lobotomy. 46  Mounting concern over bad results 47 coupled with the emerg-
ing popularity of alternative forms of treatment, such as drugs 48 and elec-
troshock,4 9 brought psychosurgical practices to a virtual halt. 50
During the sixties, the accumulation of knowledge regarding the
neuroanatomical regions that regulate emotional responses and the refine-
ment of surgical techniques 51 encouraged the belief that crippling psychiat-
ric symptoms could be alleviated with a minimum of risk by making small
and very localized incisions.5 2 The result of these advances was a re-
surgence of psychosurgery. 53 Currently, approximately 500-600 psychosur-
gical operations are being performed annually in the United States.5 4  The
46. Chorover, supra note 16, at 234-35.
47. Id. at 234. With the increase in the number of candidates for psychosurgery who were
drawn from segments of the population that exhibited fewer "disturbed" forms of behavior, the
occurrence of side effects became increasingly apparent. Id. See note 41 supra. Passivity, blunted
emotions, and a reduced capacity to plan were frequently found in post-operative patients. M.
PINES, THE BRAIN CHANGERS: SCIENTISTS AND THE NE'v MIND CONTROL 18 (1973); Knight,
Neurosurgical Aspects of Psychosurgery, 65 PROC. ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 1099 (1972). Dr. Walter
Freeman, acknowledging these side effects, wrote:
What the investigator misses most in the more highly intelligent individuals is the ability
to introspect, to speculate, to philosophize, especially in regard to the self...
Creativeness seems to be the highest form of human endeavor. It requires imagina-
tion, concentration, visualization, self-criticism, and persistence in the face of frustration,
as well as trained manual dexterity....
Theoretically, on the basis of psychologic and personality studies, creativeness should
be abolished by lobotomy....
... [O]n the whole psychosurgery reduces creativity, sometimes to the vanishing
point.
Freeman, Psychosurgery, in 2 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1521-26, 1534-35 (1959).
In many cases, the procedure was thus less a cure than a pacifier, and reduced many patients to
post-operative vegetables. Older, Psychosurgery: Ethical Issues and a Proposal for Control, 44
Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 661 (1974).
48. Mark, supra note 19, at 217-18. With the advent of powerful ataratic drugs, capable of
achieving the same therapeutic goals, the need for surgery decreased. Id. at 218.
49. Note, supra note 26, at 613. Electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) became increasingly
popular because it was a reversible and less drastic means of treatment. See Kalinowksy, The
Convulsive Therapies, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1279 (A. Friedman & H.
Kaplan ed. 1967). It is principally because ECT represents a temporary, albeit severe, intrusion
upon the brain that it is distinguishable fr'om psychosurgery. See note 24, and accompanying
text supra.
50. Chorover, supra note 16, at 235. There is some indication, however, that a limited
number of prefrontal lobotomies continue to be performed at the present time. REPORT, supra
note 6, at 2.
51. REPORT, supra note 6, at 2. For a discussion of the stereotaxic method of
psychosurgery, see note 18 supra.
52. REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
53. Older, supra note 47, at 662.
54. Edson, supra note 38, at 72. It is virtually impossible to report exactly the number of
psychosurgical operations being performed, or where they are being performed, because of the
lack of any centralized record keeping. Breggin, supra note 16, at 5567. Dr. Breggin, as a result
of his personal correspondence with practitioners, estimates that approximately 400-600 opera-
tions are performed each year in the United States. Id. at 5570. Furthermore, Dr. Breggin
notes that there are approximately 40 practicing psychosurgeons in the United States today. Id.
at 5567.
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patients are of all ages and races, and suffer from a variety of illness and
problems. 55 Most surgery today is performed on the limbic system, which
is the center for violence, hunger, sexuality, and emotional tone. 56  In addi-
tion, most subjects apparently are neither violent nor psychotic, but rather
suffer from some form of neurosis.
57
III. THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO PSYCHOSURGERY
In 1949, the Stanford Law Review addressed the problems involved in
drafting a statute to regulate the performance of lobotomies on mental pa-
tients 58 and concluded that "the greater good will be achieved by avoiding
legislative fetters and relying for protection on the high standards of the
medical profession and the individuals who compose it." 59  This conclusion
reflected the attitude of the judiciary which, in the earlier part of this cen-
tury, had adopted a "hands-off" attitude toward the mental health system.
60
Until the early 1970's, the medical profession was thus allowed to police
itself61 while patients could protect their rights only through traditional
medical malpractice actions. 62 In response to mounting public concern,
63
55. Templer, supra note 16, at 205. Dr. Orlando Andy, Chairman of the Department of
Neurosurgery at the University of Mississippi, has employed psychosurgery as a treatment for
disturbed children. Restak, supra note 16, at 54-55. Dr. Andy has operated on 13 or 14 chil-
dren ranging in age from 6 to 19. Hearings, supra note 20, at 353. Psychosurgery has also been
performed on prisoners. Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and
the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 246 (1974). Moreover, it has
been proposed as a "cure" for sexual deviants. Brain Surgery for Sexual Disorders, 4 LANCET
250, 251 (1969).
56. Mark, A Psychosurgeon's Case for Psychosurgery, 8 PSYCH. TODAY, July 1974, at 28,
30.
57. Sweet, Treatment of Medically Intractable Mental Disease By Limited Frontal
Leucotomy-ustifiable?, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1117 (1973).
58. Note, Lobotomy: Surgery for the Insane, 1 STAN. L. REV. 463 (1949).
59. Id. at 474.
60. Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72
Nw. U.L. REV. 461, 483 (1977). The "hands-off' doctrine resulted from a judicial reluctance to
interfere with institutional management and medical decisionmaking, rather than from any be-
lief that courts lacked the legal authority to intervene. Id. The courts had accepted the assertion
that judicial review of administrative practices in the mental health institutions would subvert
treatment efforts. Id. This attitude paralleled the judicial policies toward correctional institutions
as well. See, e.g., Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review
the Complaints of Convicts, 23 VILL. L. REV. 613, 61.4-15 (1978); 72 YALE L.J. 506, 507, 524
(1963). See also Siegel v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ill. 1949), aff'd, 180 F.2d 785 (7th
Cir.). cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950). In Siegel, the district court stated:
This court . . . is not prepared to establish itself as a "co-administrator" of State prisons
along with the duly appointed State officials .... [I]t is not the function of a Federal
Court to assume the status of an appellate tribunal for the purpose of reviewing each and
every act and decision of a State official.
88 F. Supp. at 99.
61. Annas & Glantz, supra note 4, at 261.
62. Id. A psychosurgical patient might successfully sue for malpractice on any of the follow-
ing three grounds: 1) negligence in the performance of the procedure; 2) failure of the patient to
give informed consent to the procedure; or 3) negligence in the method of reviewing the pro-
posed surgery or the patient's consent thereto, if such review is required. Id. at 251-58.
63. See notes 2-14 and accompanying text supra.
9
Kopesky: Psychosurgery and the Involuntarily Confined
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
however, courts, 64 state legislatures, 65 and administrative agencies 66 have
disagreed with the conclusion that psychosurgery should not be regulated
and have limited, to varying degrees, the performance of psychosurgical pro-
cedures.
A. The Judicial Response
In 1973, the first legal challenge to the use of psychosurgery was de-
cided by a Michigan state court in Kaimnowitz v. Department of Mental
Health.67 The Kaimowitz case involved proposed psychosurgery on Louis
Smith, 68 an involuntarily committed adult mental patient who had been con-
fined as a criminal sexual psychopath. 69 In 1972, Smith and his parents
signed a consent form 70 submitting him to psychosurgery as part of a re-
64. For a discussion of the judicial response to psychosurgery, see notes 67-174 and accom-
panying text infra.
65. For a discussion of the legislative response to psychosurgery, see notes 175-207 and
accompanying text infra.
66. For a discussion of the administrative response to psychosurgery, see notes 208-32 and
accompanyiny text infra.
67. No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County, July 10, 1973), reprinted in SuB-
COMM. ON CONST. RIGHTS OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 93D CONG., 2D SESS., INDI-
VIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 510 (Comm. Print 1974)
(Sup. Doc. No. Y4J89/1:93/26) [hereinafter cited as JUDICIARY REPORT]. The Kaimowitz opinion
has been summarized in the United States Law Week, 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (July 31,1973), and
the opinion, in edited form, appears in 2 PRuSON L. REP. 433 (1973).
68. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 510 n.I. The name John Doe was used through-
out the proceedings and was used in the Kaimowitz opinion in order to protect the true identity
of the subject involved. Id. After the commencement of the suit and during the proceedings,
however, Doe's true identity as Louis Smith became known. Id.
69. Id. at 510. Smith had been charged with the murder and subsequent rape of a student
nurse at a state hospital while he was confined there as a mental patient. Id. In 1953, Smith was
confined to another state hospital, without a trial on the criminal charges, under the terms of
the then existing Criminal Sexual Psychopathic Persons Act, 1939 Mich. Pub. Acts 165, as
amended by 1950 Mich. Pub. Acts 25 (repealed 1968). JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at
510 n. 1. This law was repealed by the Michigan legislature in 1968, but a savings clause permit-
ted the continued detention of those committed during the operation of the law. 1968 Mich.
Pub. Acts 143. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1942 (1975).
70. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 511. The complete form signed by Smith and his
parents provided:
Since conventional treatment efforts over a period of several years have not enabled
me to control my outbursts of rage and anti-social behavior, I submit an application to be a
subject in a research project which may offer me a form of effective therapy. This therapy
is based upon the idea that episodes of anti-social rage and sexuality might be triggered
by a disturbance in certain portions of my brain. I understand that in order to be certain
that a significant brain disturbance exists, which might relate to my anti-social behavior,
an initial operation will have to be performed. This procedure consists of placing fine
wires into my brain, which will record the electrical activity from those structures which
play a part in anger and sexuality. These electrical waves can then be studied to deter-
mine the presence of an abnormality.
In addition electrical stimulation with weak currents passed through these wires will
be done in order to find out if one or several points in the brain can trigger my episodes
of violence or unlawful sexuality. In other words this stimulation may cause me to want to
commit an aggressive or sexual act, but every effort will be made to have a sufficient
[VOL. 24: p. 949
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search study. 71  Plaintiff Kaimnowitz 7 2 sought a writ of habeas corpus on
Smith's behalf, alleging that Smith's detention for the purpose of experimen-
tal surgery was illegal. 73  Although state funding for the project was can-
celled shortly after the suit was filed and the physicians terminated the
proposed study, 74 the empanelled three-judge court continued to hear the
petition for habeas corpus relief and found Smith's detention unconstitu-
tional. 7 5 After argument on the remaining consent issue, which the court
number of people present to control me. If the brain disturbance is limited to a small
area, I understand that the investigators will destroy this part of my brain with an electri-
cal current. If the abnormality comes from a larger part of my brain, I agree that it should
be surgically removed, if the doctors determine that it can be done so, without risk of
side effects. Should the electrical activity from the parts of my brain into which the wires
have been placed reveal that there is no significant abnormality, the wire will be simply
withdrawn.
I realize that any operation on the brain carries a number of risks which may be
slight, but could be potentially serious. These risks include infection, bleeding, temporary
or permanent weakness or paralysis of one or more of my legs or arms, difficulties with
speech or thinking, as well as the ability to feel, touch, pain and temperature. Under
extraordinary circumstances, it is possible that I might not survive the operation.
Id. at 511 n.5.
71. Id. at 510-11. The research study was the result of a "Proposal for the Study of the
Treatment of the Uncontrollable Aggression at Lafayette Clinic" filed by two physicians in 1972
with the Michigan Department of Health. Id. at 510. Two separate review committees-the
Scientific Review Committee and the Human Rights Review Committee-approved the exper-
iment following an assessment of the general scientific worthiness of the study and the validity
of the consent obtained from Smith. Id. at 511.
72. The plaintiff, Gabe Kaimowitz, an attorney with Michigan Legal Services, entered the
proceeding on his own motion, grounding his standing on his status as a Michigan taxpayer.
Note, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health: A Right to be Free from Experimental
Surgery?, 54 B.U.L. REV. 301, 302 & n.8 (1974).
73. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 510. The case came to the Michigan courts origi-
nally on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Kaimowitz and the Medical Committee
for Human Rights, alleging that Smith and at least 23 other similarly situated individuals were
being illegally held. Id. The suit focused on the surgery to be performed on Smith because he
was the only appropriate subject that could be found within the state's mental health system.
Id. at 511. Notwithstanding the lack of other available subjects the decision was made to
proceed with the surgery. Id.
74. Id. In response to adverse publicity, the Director of the Department of Mental Health
withdrew funds for the research study and the two doctors terminated their plans to pursue the
proposed research. Id. See also E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 342.
75. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. HC 73-19434-AW, slip op. at 15
(Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County, March 23, 1973) (hearing on petition for habeas corpus). The
court, in reviewing the constitutionality of the Criminal Sexual Psychopathic Persons Act, 1939
Mich. Pub. Acts 165, as amended by 1950 Mich. Pub. Acts 25 (repealed 1968), noted that
differences in the criteria established for commitment and release under the statute-as re-
pealed and modified by the savings clause-and those normally applied in civil commitment
proceedings "do not wash against present day Fourteenth Amendment equal protection stan-
dards as enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States." Kaimowitz v. Department of
Mental Health, No. HC 73-19434-AW, slip op. at 15 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County, March
23, 1973), citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504
(1972); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). For
a discussion of the Michigan statute's savings clause, see note 69 supra.
Following the testimony of Smith and a psychiatrist who testified that Smith could safely be
released into society, the Wayne County Circuit Court ordered his release. JUDICIARY REPORT,
supra note 67, at 512 & n.7. Subsequent to Smith's release, the county prosecutor's office filed
1978-19791
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considered ripe for declaratory relief,76 the court entered a judgment for the
plaintiff, holding that an involuntarily committed mental patient was incapa-
ble of giving legally adequate consent to experimental psychosurgery.
77
Initially, the Kaimowitz court, recognizing the experimental nature of
the proposed operation, 78 focused on the "risk-benefit ratio" of the experi-
ment. 79  In considering the risks involved, the court noted the lack of
knowledge about the brain,8 0 the complex interaction of its various sec-
tions," l and the irreversible nature of brain surgery,8 2 and stressed that any
surgical intrusion into the brain must be approached with the utmost cau-
tion.8 3  Since neither "animal experimentation" nor "non-intrusive human
experimentation" had been exhausted, the court determined that the proce-
dure presented a considerable risk.8 4 In considering the possible benefits of
the surgery, the court found that no relationship between brain dysfunction
and abnormal aggressive behavior had been clinically established,8 5 and
a petition for a bench warrant for Smith's arrest on the original murder and rape charges. See
People v. Smith, 57 Mich. App. 556, 226 N.W.2d 673 (1975) (attempt by defendant to quash
indictment). Smith eventually confessed to the original charges and was sentenced to life im-
prisonment. Annas, Psychosurgery: Procedural Safeguards, 7 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 12
(April 1977).
76. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 512. The court held that even though the original
experimentation program had been terminated, there was nothing that would prevent it from
being instituted again in the near future, and therefore the controversy was not moot. Id.,
citing United States v. Phosphate Export Ass'n., 339 U.S. 199, 203 (1968); Milford v. People's
Community Hosp. Auth., 380 Mich. 49, 55-56, 155 N.W.2d 835, 838 (1968).
77. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 512, 523. Framing the key issue in the case, the
court queried:
After the failure of established therapies, may an adult or a legally appointed guardian, if
the adult is involuntarily detained at a facility within the jurisdiction of the State Depart-
ment of Mental Health, give legally adequate consent to an innovative or experimental
surgical procedure on the brain, if there is demonstrable physical abnormality of the
brain, and the procedure is designed to ameliorate behavior, which is either personally
tormenting to the patient, or so profoundly disruptive that the patient cannot safely live,
or live with others?
Id. at 512. This question was answered by the court in the negative. Id. at 523.
78. Id. at 514.
79. Id. at 513-15. One commentator has described the risk-benefit ratio as follows:
The risk-benefit ratio is a device used by physicians to determine the advisability of a
medical procedure. Although not actually expressed as a ratio, the term denotes the two
classes of factors to be weighed against one another; the risk of failure or adverse effects
versus the probability of achieving the desired result.
Comment, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health: Involuntary Mental Patient Cannot
Give Informed Consent to Experimental Surgery, 4 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 207, 209
(1974).
80. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 513-14.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 514.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 514-15. See note 16 supra.
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further noted the possibility of adverse consequences. 86 The court con-
cluded that psychosurgery should never be undertaken upon involuntarily
committed populations where there is a high risk-benefit ratio due to the
impossibility of obtaining truly informed consent from such individuals. 8
7
In determining whether Smith was in fact incapable of informed con-
sent,"" the Kaimowitz court adopted three standards from the Nuernberg
Code 8 9 to govern an individual's capacity in this area: competency, knowl-
edge, and voluntariness. 90  Competency, the court recognized, "requires
86. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 515. The specific adverse reactions noted by the
court included flattened emotional responses, lack of abstract reasoning ability, loss of capacity
for new learning, general sedation and apathy, impairment of memory, and, in some cases,
heightened rage reactions. Id.
87. Id. at 514. The relationship between the risk-benefit ratio and informed consent was
explained by the court as follows:
Informed consent is a requirement of variable demands. Being certain that a patient
has consented adequately to an operation, for example, is much more important when
doctors are going to undertake an experimental, dangerous, and intrusive procedure than,
for example, when they are going to remove an appendix. When a procedure is experi-
mental, dangerous, ani intrusive, special safeguards are necessary. The risk-benefit ratio
must be carefully considered, and the question of consent thorougly explored.
Id. at 517. With regard to the question of the degree of risk, one court has held that a 1%
chance of paralysis constituted a risk of serious harm, stating: "[A] very small chance of death or
serious disablement may well be significant." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 778 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972): For a statement of the risks associated with the pro-
posed surgery to Smith, see note 70 supra. The mortality rate in psychosurgical operations has
been placed at I to 4% by one study, Greenblatt & Myerson, supra note 38, at 1012, and at 2%
bv another study. Watts & Freeman, Prefrontal Lobotomy: Indications and Results in Schizo-
phrenia, 75 Am. J. SURGERY 227, 230 (1948).
88. Informed consent is the sine qua non for any medical procedure. See, e.g., Fortner v.
Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 282, 261 N.W. 762, 765 (1935); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 26 App. Div. 2d
693, 272 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1966), rev'd as to defendant hospital, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296,
280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967); Waltz & Scheuneman, Inforned Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L.
REV. 628, 632-34, 640 (1969).
The general standard with respect to informed consent is derived from Natanson v. Kline,
187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960). The Natanson rule requires disclosure of facts which a
reasonable medical practitioner in a similar community and similar school of medical thought
would have disclosed to a patient who is about to undergo treatment. Id. at 189-90, 354 P.2d at
673. The Natanson rule has been adopted by the majority of American jurisdictions. Note,
supra note 25, at 1010 n.10. There is also a minority rule which requires the disclosure of all
information which a reasonable patient would have thought "material" in making a decision to
undergo treatment. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Riedinger v. Colburn, 361 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Idaho 1973); Cobles v. Grant, 8
Cal. App. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). The special informed consent form signed by
Smith and his parents included the disclosures required under either the Natanson rule or the
minority rule. See note 70 supra.
89. United States v. Karl Brandt, 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military
Tribunals 181, 181-82 (1947). In 1947, various defendants were found guilty of crimes against
humanity for carrying out medical experiments on human subjects. Id. at 181. The Military
Tribunal set forth 10 principles for the conduct of medical experiments which have since be-
come known as the Nuernberg Code. Id. at 181-82.
90. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 517-18. The court emphasized the first principle
of the Nuernberg Code, which provides:
1. The voluntarv consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means thai the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent;
should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the interven-
1978-1979]
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the ability of the subject to understand rationally the nature of the pro-
cedure, its risks, and other relevant information." 91 The court found that
Smith's competency was "particularly vulnerable as a result of his mental
condition, the deprivation stemming from involuntary confinement, and the
effects of the phenomenon of 'institutionalization.'" 92 On the issue of
Smith's knowledge, the court concluded that a knowledgeable consent was
"literally impossible" because of a lack of scientific information necessary for
predicting the outcome of the surgery. 9 3  With regard to the voluntariness
of the consent, the Kaiinowitz court noted that the Nuernberg Code refers
to a "free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force,
tion of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form
of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the
elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and
enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirma-
tive decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature,
duration and purpose of the experiment; the methods and means by which it is to be
conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects
upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the experi-
ment.
United States v. Karl Brandt, 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribu-
nals 181-82 (1947) (emphasis added). See JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 517. By adopting
the Nuernberg Code as its standard for reviewing Smith's informed consent to the psychosurgi-
cal procedure, the Kaimowitz Court rejected as inadequate the traditional disclosure require-
ments of informed consent. Id. For a discussion of the traditional informed consent standards,
see note 88 supra. Instead, the court substituted a standard similar to that enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court for review of a waiver of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, for
example, the Court held that a defendant's waiver of his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel must be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 475-76 (1966). Similarly, in Brady, which dealt with the voluntariness of a guilty plea, the
Court stated that "[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (footnote omitted).
91. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 518.
92. Id. The Kainowitz court noted:
Although an involuntarily detained mental patient may have a sufficient I.Q. to intel-
lectually comprehend his circumstances . . . the very nature of his incarceration di-
minishes the capacity to consent to psychosurgery ...
... The fact of institutional confinement has special force in undermining the capac-
ity of the mental patient to make a competent decision on this issue, even though he be
intellectually competent to do so. In the routine of institutional life, most decisions are
made for patients ...
Institutionalization tends to strip the individual of the support which permits him to
maintain his sense of self-worth and the value of his own physical and mental integrity.
An involuntarilv confined mental patient clearly has diminished capacity for making a
decision about irreversible experimental psychosurgery.
Id. at 518-19 (emphasis supplied by the court). It is submitted, however, that the court's
analysis of the factors bearing on Smith's diminished capacity is not relevant to its concept of
competency. See text accompanying note 91 supra. Rather, the factors are more appropriate to
an analysis of the voluntariness of the consent. Barnhart, Pinkerton & Roth, Informed Consent
to Organic Behavior Control, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 39, 78-79 (1977); notes 94 & 95 and
accompanying text infra.
93. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 519. See notes 79-86 and accompanying text
supra.
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fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or
coercion." 94  The court found that mental institutions create a pervasive
atmosphere of constraint and coercion which precludes the voluntary nature
of a consent to such an experimental procedure.
95
Although the disposition of the consent issue fully resolved the merits of
the case, the Kairnowitz court also stated alternative, constitutional reasons
for not recognizing the patient's consent. 96 The court reasoned that the use
of experimental psychosurgical techniques on a mental patient involuntarily
confined in a state institution, even with the patient's formal consent, would
violate the patient's first amendment right to generate ideas as well as his
constitutionally protected right to privacy. 97 Initially, the court noted that
the first amendment protects freedom of communication and freedom of ex-
pression of ideas. 98 Since these freedoms would be meaningless without the
94. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 519, quoting United States v. Karl Brandt, 2
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals 181-82 (1947) (emphasis
supplied by the court). For the text of the relevant portion of the Nuernberg Code, see note 90
supra.
95. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 519-20. The court focused on the degree of con-
trol exercised by institutional authorities over the privileges of a patient and the desire of the
patient to exhibit an attitude of cooperation. Id. at 519. Dr. Erving Goffman has described the
effects of prolonged confinement in "total institutions," which he defines as places of "residence
and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an
appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life." E.
COFFMAN, ASYLUMS xiii (1961). One of the effects noted by Dr. Goffman is the process of
"mortification of the self," whereby the patient's self-concept is weakened by the immediate and
total loss of the support provided by certain stable social arrangements in his "home world." Id.
at 14. Whatever the effect of 18 years of confinement on Smith, it should be noted that Smith
himself withdrew his consent to the surgery after he had been released. N.Y. Times, April 5,
1973, at 26, col. 1.
With respect to the Kaimowitz court's analysis of the consent issue, some commentators
have construed the opinion as finding that the dual factors of institutionalization and the un-
favorable risk-benefit ratio were separate and independent reasons for invalidating Smith's con-
sent. Annas & Glantz, supra note 4, at 262-63. Noting the court's concern over the effect of
institutionalization on the patient's capacity to render voluntary consent, the commentators
question the importance of the risk-benefit ratio. Id. The court, however, established the rela-
tionship between the risk-benefit ratio and the consent of the individual, noting that the more
unfavorable the ratio, the greater the need to evaluate the consent. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra
note 67, at 517. See note 87 supra. Because of this relationship, the court asserted that its
holding did not prevent involuntarily confined patients from giving adequate consent to ac-
cepted neurological procedures or even to the procedure proposed in the research study (amyg-
dalotomy) should it ultimately become an accepted, nonexperimental technique. JUDICIARY RE-
PORT, supra note 67, at 523. This conclusion has been criticized as being logically incompatible
with the court's holding with respect to the informed consent of Smith in Kaimowitz. See Annas
& Glantz, supra note 74, at 262-63.
96. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 520-23. The court found the requisite state action
in the fact that the involuntarily committed mental patients had been detained by the state. Id.
at 520.
97. Id. at 520-23.
98. Id. at 521. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
the'reof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
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freedom to generate ideas, it was urged that the first amendment must
necessarily protect the process of mentation. 9 9 The court found that
psychosurgery tends to result in "the blunting of emotions, the deadening of
memory," and the reduction of sensory perception, 100 and that the proce-
dure "limits the ability to generate new ideas." 101 The court determined
that this reduction in the capacity to generate new ideas places psychosur-
gery in conflict with the protections of the first amendment, 1 02 stating:
To allow an involuntarily detained mental patient to consent to
the type of psychosurgery proposed in this case, and to permit the
State to perform it, would be to condone State action in violation
of basic First Amendment rights of such patients, because impair-
ing the power to generate new ideas inhibits the full dissemination
of ideas. '
0 3
Furthermore, the court concluded that the proposed psychosurgery
would violate the right of privacy recognized by the Supreme Court of the
United States as emanating from the first, fifth, and fourteenth amend-
ments.' 0 4  In the court's view, psychosurgery constituted an impermissible
99. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 522. The court stated:
Freedom of speech and expression, and the right of all men to disseminate ideas,
popular and unpopular, are fundamental to ordered liberty. Government has no power or
right to control men's minds, thoughts, and expressions. This is the command of the First
Amendment. And we adhere to it in holding an involuntarily detained mental patient may
not consent to experimental psychosurgery.
For, if the First Amendment protects the freedom to express ideas, it necessarily
follows that it must protect the freedom to generate ideas. Without the latter protection,
the former is meaningless.
Id. See Shapiro, supra note 55, at 255-73; Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to
"Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616,
661-65 (1972). See also Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973). In Mackey, the
Ninth Circuit reversed an order dismissing a complaint which had alleged that the petitioner, a
prisoner, had been subjected to an experimental drug for the purpose of behavior modification
through aversion therapy without his consent. Id. at 877-78. The court stated: "Proof of such
matters could, in our judgment, raise serious consitutional questions respecting cruel and un-
usual punishment or impermissible tinkering twith the mental processes." Id. at 878 (emphasis
added).
100. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 522. See note 86 supra.
101. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 522.
102. Id.
103. Id. The first amendment analysis advanced by the court in Kainowitz was recently dis-
cussed in Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978). Rennie involved a motion for a
preliminary injunction filed by a patient in a state mental institution seeking to enjoin the
psychiatrists and officials at the institution from forcibly administering psychotropic drugs to him
in the absence of an emergency situation. Id. at 1134. The plaintiff claimed that the drug dulled
his senses and made it difficult for him to speak. Id. at 1144. The Rennie court noted the
temporary nature of these side effects and therefore concluded that the effect on mentation
differed sharply from the problem presented in Kaimowitz. Id. The court concluded that the
temporary dulling of the senses accompanying the forced medication "does not rise to the level
of the First Amendment violation found in Kaimowitz." Id.
104. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 522. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, XIV. The
Kaimowitz court relied upon the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade,
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intrusion into the patient's protected mental processes. 10 5 Finally, the
Kaimowitz court found that no compelling state interest in fostering
psychosurgery on involuntarily confined mental patients had been shown
which was sufficient to overcome the protections of the first amendment '
0 6
or the right of privacy.' 0 7
A similarly restrictive position was adopted in Wyatt v. Hardin,10 8
where the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama
imposed an absolute ban on psychosurgery' 0 9 in state operated institutions
in Alabama. The Hardin decision is one part of the litigation involving the
seminal case of Wyatt v. Stickney.110 Stickney involved a class action origi-
nally filed in 1970 on behalf of patients involuntarily confined for treatment
at Bryce Hospital in Alabama."' In 1971, in a formal opinion and decree,
the district court held that these involuntarily committed patients "unques-
tionably have a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as
will give each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his
or her mental condition." 112 The court concluded that patients at Bryce
410 U.S. 113 (1973), Stanley v. Georgia, 395 U.S. 557 (1969), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1962), as the basis for the constitutional right of privacy. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra
note 67, at 522. See Shapiro, supra note 55, at 273-76; Note, supra note 99, at 661-65.
105. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 523. The Kaimowitz court explained the relation-
ship between psychosurgery and the right of privacy as follows:
Intrusion into one's intellect, when one is involuntarily detained and subject to the
control of institutional authorities, is an intrusion into one's constitutionally protected
right of privacy. If one is not protected in his thoughts, behavior, personality and iden-
tity, then the right of privacy becomes meaningless ....
• . . In the hierarchy of values, it is more important to protect one's mental processes
than to protect even the privacy of the marital bed. To authorize an involuntarily detained
mental patient to consent to experimental psychosurgery would be to fail to recognize and
follow the mandates of the Supreme Court of the United States, which has constitution-
ally protected the privacy of body and mind.
id.
106. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 522. See notes 98-103 and accompanying text
supra.
107. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 523. It is submitted that the court's finding in
Kaimowitz that the performance of psychosurgery impinges upon constitutionally protected in-
terests is logically consistent with the strict standard adopted by the court for reviewing Smith's
consent to the surgery. See notes 88-95 and accompanying text supra. Furthermore, since
psychosurgery implicates an individual's right of free speech and right of privacy, it is submitted
that consent to a psychosurgical operation is, in fact, a waiver of those constitutional rights, and
therefore review of the legal adequacy of that consent should not be under the traditional
informed consent standards. For a discussion of the standards employed in determining the
sufficiency of a waiver of constitutional rights and the relationship of those standards to psycho-
surgery, see note 90 supra. For a discussion of the traditional informed consent standards, see
note 88 supra. For a further discussion of the Kaimowitz opinion, see 50 Cm.-KENT L. REv.
526 (1973); 20 WAYNE L. REV. 1309 (1974).
108. [July-August 1976] 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 55 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 28, 1975), modi-
fied, No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala. July 1, 1975).
109. [July-August 1976] 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 56.
110. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nona. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974).
111. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 782 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
112. Id. at 784, citing Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Rouse v. Cam-
eron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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were being denied their right to treatment, 113 and granted the defend-
ants 114 six months in which to raise the level of care at Bryce to the con-
stitutionally required minimum. 115 The court also ordered the defendants
to file reports defining the mission and functions of Bryce Hospital,
1 1 6
specifying the subjective and objective standards required to furnish
adequate care to the treatable mentally ill, 1 1 7 and detailing the hospital's
progress toward the implementation of minimum constitutional standards.
1 18
After reviewing these reports, the district court concluded that the de-
fendants had failed to promulgate and implement a treatment program satis-
fying minimum medical and constitutional requisites." 9  From the evi-
dence, the court determined that whatever treatment was provided at Bryce
was grossly deficient and failed to satisfy the minimum standards. 12
0  Con-
sequently, the district court ordered that a formal hearing be held at which
the parties and amici would have the opportunity to submit proposed stan-
dards for constitutionally adequate treatment and to present expert tes-
timony in support of their proposals. 121
Pursuant to this order, a hearing was held, 1 22 after which the district
court promulgated minimum medical and constitutional standards for public
institutions involved in the treatment of the mentally ill 123 and ordered their
implementation. 124  As part of these minimum requirements, the district
court set forth standard 9 which concerned the use of extraordinary or po-
tentially hazardous modes of treatment. 1 25 Standard 9 provided: "Patients
have a right not to be subjected to treatment procedures such as lobotomy,
electro-convulsive treatment, adversive reinforcement conditioning or other
unusual or hazardous treatment procedures without their express and in-
formed consent after consultation with counsel or interested party of the
patient's choice." 126
113. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
114. The defendants included the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Depart-
ment of Mental Health of the State of Alabama, the members of the Alabama Mental Health
Board, the Governor of Alabama, and the probate judge of Montgomery County, as a represen-
tative of the other probate judges in Alabama. Id. at 782.
115. Id. at 785.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 785-86.
118. Id. at 786.
119. Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
120. Id, at 1344. The district court found that the defendant's treatment program was defi-
cient in three fundamental areas in that it failed to provide: 1) a humane psychological and
physical environment; 2) qualified staff in numbers sufficient to administer adequate treatment;
and 3) individualized treatment plans. Id. at 1343-44. More specifically, the court found that
certain conditions, such as nontherapeutic, uncompensated work assignments and the absence of
any semblance of privacy, constituted dehumanizing factors contributing to the degeneration of
the patient's self-esteem. Id. at 1343.
121. Id. at 1344.
122. 344 F. Supp. at 375.
123. Id. at 376, 379-86.
124. Id. at 376, 378.
125. Id. at 380.
126. Id.
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In 1974, however, following a suggestion by the defendants, the district
court undertook a substantial revision of standard 9.127 After considering
the requests and responses filed by the parties and amici, and after review-
ing Bryce's experiences in operating under standard 9, the district court, in
part, ordered: "1. No lobotomy, psychosurgery or other unusual, hazardous
or intrusive surgical procedure designed to alter or affect a patient's mental
condition shall be performed on any patient confined at any institution main-
tained by or under the control of the defendants." 128 In the opinion accom-
panying the order, the district court emphasized that it was not undertaking
to determine appropriate forms of treatment in particular situations, 129 as
"[s]uch a diagnostic decision is a medical judgment and is not within the
province, jurisdiction or expertise of this Court." 130 The district court
failed, however, to adequately explain the basis for its ban on psychosurgery
and it is unclear whether the court relied on medical or legal arguments in
making its determination.
In contrast to the strict prohibitive approach adopted in Kaimowitz 131
and Hardin,'3 2 a recent California decision, Aden v. Younger, 1 33 sets forth a
less restrictive attitude toward the performance of psychosurgery. In Aden, a
mental patient who desired psychosurgery and the patient's physician 134
challenged the constitutionality of the then existing version of California's
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act,' 13  which set forth the conditions under which
psychosurgery could be performed.136  The petitioner alleged that the legis-
127. Wyatt v. Hardin, [July-August 1976] 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 55 (M.D. Ala.
Feb. 28, 1975).
128. Id. at 56.
129. Id. at 55.
130. Id.
131. For a discussion of Kainowitz, see notes 67-107 and accompanying text supra.
132. For a discussion of the litigation which culminated in the order in Hardin, see notes
108-30 and accompanying text supra.
133. 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1976).
134. Id. at 668, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 538-39. The petitioners in Aden included two mentally ill
individuals and their attending physicians. Id. One patient sought a form of psychosurgery re-
ferred to as a "multiple target procedure." Id. The other petitioner sought electro-convulsive
therapy. Id. See note 49 supra. Both petitioners sought a peremptory writ of mandamus perma-
nently preventing the Attorney General of California, the Director of Health, and the Board of
Medical Examiners from enforcing the provisions of the statute. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 668-70, 129
Cal. Rptr. at 538-40.
135. 1967 Cal. Stats. ch. 1667, as amended by 1968 Cal. Stats. ch. 1374; 1969 Cal. Stats. chs.
722, 1472; 1970 Cal. Stats. chs. 35, 68, 509, 516, 566, 593, 1129, 1219, 1291, 1502, 1627; 1971
Cal. Stats. chs. 242, 776, 815, 1162, 1443, 1459, 1581, 1593; 1972 Cal. Stats. chs. 544, 556, 559,
574, 692, 1055, 1058, 1127, 1228, 1377; 1973 Cal. Stats. chs. 142, 523, 959, 1161, 1212; 1974
Cal. Stats. chs. 486, 833, 1024, 1060, 1511, 1534; 1975 Cal. Stats. chs. 960, 1108, 1258, 1274
(current version at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5404.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1978)).
136. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 668-69, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 539. The challenged provisions of the
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act were summarized by the Aden court as follows:
Patients have the right to refuse psychosurgery and the professional person in charge
of the facility may not deny them that right. If a patient refuses consent, it must be
entered on the record.
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lation limited access to psychosurgery and therefore violated his first
amendment and privacy rights.
137
The petitioner's argument was based on the premise that there exists a
fundamental right of privacy, a right to treatment, and rights of freedom of
speech and thought which may not be inhibited by legislation absent a com-
pelling state interest. 138  While noting that the right to privacy includes
privacy of the mind, 139 the court in Aden chose not to base its decision on
this protected interest. Moreover, the court did not find it necessary to de-
cide whether the right to treatment "is deserving of constitutional protection
in and of itself." 140 Instead, the court focused on the freedom of thought
If a patient wants psychosurgery, then the conditions for performing such surgery
include:
(a) The patient must give written, informed consent, dated, witnessed and entered in
his record. The consent may be withdrawn at any time. An oral explanation by the doctor
is necessary.
(b) The patient must have capacity to consent.
(c) An oral explanation must be given to a responsible relative, guardian or conser-
vator.
(d) The reasons for surgery must be in the patient's treatment record, other treat-
ments must be exhausted and surgery must be critically needed.
(e) Three appointed physicians (two board-certified psychiatrists or neurosurgeons),
must examine the patient and unanimously agree with the treating physician's determina-
tion that the patient has capacity to consent. There must be a 72-hour wait after the
patient's written consent before surgery.
id.
137. Id. at 672-73, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 541-42.
138. Id. at 678, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 545-46. The Aden court noted that the rights of privacy,
freedom of speech and freedom of thought, and the right to medical treatment were com-
plementary in nature, stating: "On the one hand, out of deference to personal autonomy, the
state prohibits involuntary treatment. On the other hand, again out of deference to personal
autonomy, the state promotes access to voluntary treatment which restores functionality and
thus enhances future autonomy." Id. at 678 n.9, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546 n.9. See Shapiro, supra
note 55, at 257.
139. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 679, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546. The Aden court's analysis of the source of
the right to mental privacy was similar to that employed by the Michigan court in Kaimowitz.
See id.; notes 104-07 and accompanying text supra.
140. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 679, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546 (citation omitted). Although the court in
Aden chose not to address the issue of the existence of an independent constitutional right to
treatment, persons committed to nonpenal institutions have attempted to establish a constitu-
tional right to humane care and treatment in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Comes v.
Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794, 799-800 (1st Cir. 1973) (sexual offenders and dangerous delinquents);
United States v. Pardue, 354 F. Supp. 1377, 1382 (D. Conn. 1973) (persons incompetent to
stand trial); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 459 (N.D. Ind. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (juvenile delinquents); Martarella v. Kelly, 349 F. Supp.
575, 585, 598-600 (S.D.N.Y, 1972), enforced, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N,Y. 1973) ("persons in
need of supervision"). It has been firmly established by both state and federal courts that when
persons are committed for the purposes of treatment, treatment must in fact be provided. See,
e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp.
1209, 1216 (E.D. La. 1976); Woe v. Mathers, 408 F. Supp. 419, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), re-
nanded in part and dismissed in part sub nora. Woe v. Weinberger, 556 F.2d 563 (2d Cir.),
affd, 562 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1048 (1978); Dixon v. Weinberger, 405
F. Supp. 974, 978 (D.D.C. 1975); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1197 (N.D. Ohio
1974); Welsh v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 500-01 (D. Minn. 1974), affd in part and rev'd in
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and speech, which it noted may have been indirectly diminished by the
California legislation.14 1 The court stated:
The right to be free in the exercise of one's own thoughts is
essential to the exercise of other constitutionally guaranteed rights.
First Amendment rights of free speech would mean little if the
state were to control thought. . . . Here the state has sought to
control neither what is thought by mental patients, nor how they
think. Rather, the state is attempting to regulate the use of proce-
dures which touch upon thought processes in significant ways, with
neither the intention nor the effect of regulating thought processes
per se. Yet despite the lack of any showing the state has attempted
to regulate freedom of thought, this legislation may diminish this
right. If so, the legislation can only be sustained by showing (1) it
is necessary to further a "compelling state interest" and (2) the
least drastic means has been employed to further those in-
terests. 142
According to the Aden court, the state's interests included "the protec-
tion of the right to refuse treatment" 143 and "the prevention of unnecessary
administration of hazardous and intrusive treatments." 144 Examining the
legislation in light of the announced interests of the state, the court invali-
dated the requirement of notification to a "relative, guardian or conservator"
of the reasons for the surgery and an explanation of the procedure before the
treatment could be administered.145 The court found that this requirement
constituted an impermissible invasion of the patient's right to privacy and
confidentiality, and that it served no legitimate state purpose. 146  Other
part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y.2d 161, 305 N.E.2d
903, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1973); Renelli v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 73 Misc. 2d 261, 340
N.Y.S.2d 498 (1973). The first statement on the right to treatment may be found in Birnbaum,
The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
141. 547 Cal. App. 3d at 679, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
142. Id., citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973).
143. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 680, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 547. The corollary to the right to receive
treatment is the right of an involuntarily confined individual to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Scott
v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 357 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Souder v. McGuire, 423 F. Supp. 830, 832 (M.D. Pa. 1976);
Wyatt v. Sticknev, 344 F. Supp. 387, 400 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt,
503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Plotkin, supra note 60, at 482-502.
144. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 681, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 547. The Aden court, citing Kaimowitz, found
that psychosurgical procedures are "destructive" of brain tissue and "experimental" in nature,
and present "undisputed dangers" to the patient. Id. at 671-72, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 541, citing
Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County,
July 10, 1973).
145. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 681, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 547. For a summary of the challenged provi-
sions of the statute, see note 136 supra.
146. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 681, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 547. The court's conclusion that the provision
requiring notification to a third party served no compelling state interest was based on the fact
that no third party had standing to assert the patient's individual rights. Id. Furthermore, in
regard to the requirement that a procedure be "critically needed" for the patient's welfare, the
court found that the term was "so imprecise" as to be "impermissibly vague" because the term
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provisions of the statute were upheld as furthering the state's interest with a
minimal invasion of privacy.147
The provisions requiring mandatory approval of the psychosurgery by a
review committee 148 posed the most difficult issues for the Aden court. It
was noted that the requirement of approval may result in the denial of one
particular form of treatment to some patients, which would result in the
continued impairment of their freedom of thought. 149 In its search for com-
pelling state interests supporting the mandatory review provisions, the court
distinguished between review of the patient's consent and review of the sub-
stantive merits of the proposed surgery. 150 With respect to the review of
the patient's consent, the Aden court characterized the state's interest in
protecting the right of the patient to refuse treatment as an adequate justifi-
cation for a review procedure that would insure the competency and volun-
tariness of the patient's consent. 15 1 Committee review of a mental patient's
competence to consent was reasoned to be constitutional because, given the
fact of involuntary detention, there was reason to suspect that the patient
may be incompetent for the purpose of consenting to psychosurgery. 152  In
"provides no guide to the degree of need required." Id. at 677-78, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 545. See
note 136 supra.
147. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 681-82, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 547-48. For example, the court concluded
that although the establishment of a reporting system designed to control possible abuses in the
manner in which psychosurgery is performed constituted a limited infringement upon a patient's
right to privacy, the invasion was permissible under the Constitution in light of the fact that the
recipients of the information would be those most likely to assist in protecting a patient's rights.
Id. The Aden court also held that while the provisions of the statute listing the items of informa-
tion required to be orally explained to the mental patient in order to obtain his informed con-
sent to psychosurgery constituted a minimal invasion of the patient's privacy, the procedure for
obtaining such consent was nonetheless constitutional in view of the state's interest in protecting
the patient's right to refuse treatment. Id. at 682, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
148. See note 136 supra.
149. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 680, 682, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546-47, 548. The Aden court explained:
Freedom of thought is intimately touched upon by any regulation of procedures af-
fecting thought and feelings. In an effort to protect freedom of thought, the state has put
procedural and substantive obstacles in the path of those who both need and desire cer-
tain forms of treatment, and in that way their freedom of thought remains impaired be-
cause they cannot get treatment. The means of alleviating mental disorders generate their
own kinds of fear and misunderstanding. This attitude touches our public affairs; the fact
of treatment alone may impair our confidence in people of unquestioned talent and indus-
try. Psychosurgery ... [is] viewed, rightly or wrongly, as [a] drastic, radical [form] of
treatment compared to psychotherapy or drug therapy, and indicative of more severe
illness. Public exposure, or even disclosure to a limited number of government represen-
tatives, may have a chilling effect on patients' efforts to undergo these treatments,
thereby restricting their freedom of thought. Some patients will be denied treatment as a
natural and intended result of this legislation. Although the reasons for such denials may
be the patient's own best interests, such regulation may besjustified by a compelling state
interest.
Id. at 680, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546-47.
150. Id. at 682, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
151. Id. at 682-83, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
152. Id. at 682-83, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548. The Aden court noted that the case of the involun-
tarily detained individual presented the dilemma of either prohibiting the administration of
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analyzing the requirement of substantive review of the proposed
psychosurgery, the court recognized that the legislation was designed to pro-
tect the individual's autonomy. 153  Substantive review was therefore upheld
as a means of insuring the wisdom of the patient's consent.1
54
The Aden court also approved the requirement that the three physicians
be unanimous in their review of the patient's consent and their approval of
the proposed surgery. 155 The court concluded that "[r]equiring unanimity
by the review committee insures each approved treatment is an appropriate
use of an experimental procedure." 156
The major impact of the Aden decision was its approval of a review
committee mechanism to insure that informed, voluntary, and competent
consent was actually obtained from the patient prior to the surgery. 1 57  A
psychosurgery to such persons, as the Michigan court did in Kaimowitz, or providing for a
substitute decisionmaking process. Id., citing Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No.
73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County, July 10, 1973). The Aden court concluded that
the establishment of g review committee to evaluate the patient's consent was justified by the
state's interest in preventing the involuntary administration of psychosurgery. 57 Cal. App. 3d
at 682-83, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548. By upholding the validity of the review committee, the
California court implicitly rejected the holding of Kaimowitz that an involuntarily confined indi-
vidual was incapable of giving legally adequate consent to psychosurgery. For a discussion of the
Kaimowitz holding on the issue of consent, see notes 88-95 and accompanying text supra.
153. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 682-83, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548-49.
154. Id. The compelling state interest justifying substantive review of the proposed
psychosurgery was the state's interest in preventing the unnecessary administration of hazardous
and intrusive treatments. Id. The court stated:
The hazardous, experimental nature of psychosurgery is a legitimate reason for the
state to regulate its use as a treatment of last resort. Requiring unanimity by the review
committee insures each approved treatment is an appropriate use of an experimental pro-
cedure. The importance of assuring that consents to psychosurgery be voluntarily given
by informed, competent mental patients, plus the need to regulate an experimental pro-
cedure, justify the Legislature's decision to remove these considerations from the sole
discretion of the treating physician. There are sound reasons why the treating physician's
assessment of his patient's competency and voluntariness may not always be objective,
and he may not necessarily be the best or most objective judge of how appropriate an
experimental procedure would be. Because the consequences to the patient of such a
procedure are so serious, and the effects he may suffer are so intrusive and irreversible,
tort damages are totally inadequate. The need for some form of restraint is a sufficiently
compelling state interest to justify the attendant invasion of the patient's right to privacy.
Id.
The Aden court, however, distinguished electro-convulsive therapy from psychosurgery and
concluded that a similar review procedure requiring substantive review of the decision to ad-
minister ECT constituted a serious infringement of the patient's right to privacy. Id. at 684, 129
Cal. Rptr. at 549. The court reasoned that since ECT was not an experimental procedure, and
its hazards were not as serious as those of psychosurgery, the state had no interest which
justified the substitution of a review committee's decision for that of the attending physician
once it had been determined that the patient's consent was informed and voluntary. Id. The
Aden court, like the court in Kaimowitz, thus indicated the possibility that further scientific
validation of psychosurgery would warrant a different, less restrictive approach to its regulation.
For a discussion of this aspect of the Kaimowitz opinion, see note 95 supra.
155. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 683, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548. See note 136 supra.
156. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 683, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
157. See notes 148-52 and accompanying text supra.
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second form of review procedure was accepted by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in Price v. Sheppard.158 In Price, the mother of a minor who
was involuntarily committed to a state mental hospital brought suit against
the medical director of the hospital for assault and battery and for violation
of the minor's civil rights.159 The plaintiff, as mother and natural guardian
of the minor, objected to a series of twenty electroshock treatments adminis-
tered to her son, against her express wishes. 160 The trial court ordered
summary judgment for the defendant' 61 and, on appeal, the order was af-
firmed. 
16 2
The court in Price first rejected the claim that the administration of the
treatments constituted cruel or unusual punishment. 163  The court also held
that the director, who had acted in good faith 164 and without knowledge that
he was possibly violating a clearly established constitutional right, 16 5 was
immune from liability under the civil rights statute 166 and was immune from
tort liability. 167
Recognizing the potentially great impact of these more intrusive forms
of treatment, however, the Price court was reluctant to leave the imposition
of these procedures solely to the discretion of the medical personnel at the
state hospitals 168 in those cases where a parent or guardian has refused to
consent to the treatment. For that reason, the court adopted the following
procedure: 169
(1) If the patient is incompetent to give consent or refuses
consent or his guardian other than persons responsible for his
commitment also refuses his consent, before more intrusive forms
158. 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d at 905 (1976).
159. Id. at 251-52, 239 N.W.2d at 907. The civil rights claim was brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1976).
160. 307 Minn. at 251-53, 239 N.W.2d at 907-08.
161. Id. at 252, 239 N.W.2d at 907. The defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
assault and battery claim was granted on the basis of the trial court's ruling that the defendant,
acting in his official capacity, was immune from suit. Id. Summary judgment was also granted
on the civil rights claim on the ground that electroshock treatments were neither cruel nor
unusual punishment under the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII, nor a violation of the right to privacy. 307 Minn. at 252, 239 N.W.2d at
907.
162. 307 Minn. at 252, 239 N.W.2d at 907.
163. Id. at 256, 239 N.W.2d at 909. The court held that "if the electroshock treatments ...
served a legitimate purpose rather than deterrence or reprimand, the Eighth Amendment claim
must fail." Id. at 255, 239 N.W.2d at 909. See generally Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-97
(1958). The Price court concluded that since the patient had failed to respond to other forms of
treatment, the administration of the electroshock treatments was not cruel or unusual punish-
ment. 307 Minn. at 256, 239 N.W.2d at 909.
164. 307 Minn. at 261-62, 239 N.W.2d at 912.
165. Id. at 261, 239 N.W.2d at 912, citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
166. 307 Minn. at 260, 239 N.W.2d at 912.
167. Id. at 260 n.9, 239 N.W.2d at 912 n.9.
168. Id. at 262, 239 N.W.2d at 912-13.
169. Id. at 262, 239 N.W.2d at 913.
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of treatment may be utilized, the medical director of the state hos-
pital must petition the probate division of the county court in the
county in which the hospital is located for an order authorizing the
prescribed treatment;
(2) the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the
interests of the pdtient;
(3) in an adversary proceeding, pursuant to the petition, the
court shall determine the necessity and reasonableness of the pre-
scribed treatment.' 7 o
In making this determination, the Price court concluded that the pa-
tient's need for treatment should be balanced against the intrusiveness of the
prescribed treatment. 171  Factors which should be considered included:
(1) the extent and duration of changes in behavior patterns and
mental activity effected by the treatment, (2) the risks of adverse
side effects, (3) the experimental nature of the treatment, (4) its
acceptance by the medical community of this state, (5) the extent
of intrusion into the patient's body and the pain connected with
the treatment, and (6) the patient's ability to competently deter-
mine for himself whether the treatment is desirable.
172
Although the Price court was unable to delineate those forms of treatment
which required this procedural hearing from those which did not,173 it specif-
ically held that the procedure must be followed where psychosurgery or
electroshock therapy is proposed.
174
B. The Legislative Response
While a number of state legislatures have attempted to regulate the
performance of psychosurgical procedures, their enactments have not been
entirely responsive to the issues that are involved. One group of states has
adopted a retained rights approach to mental patients that provides the pa-
170. Id. (footnotes omitted).
171. Id. at 262, 239 N.W.2d at 913.
172. Id. at 262-63, 239 N.W.2d at 913 (footnote omitted). In formulating the factors to be
considered by the reviewing court, the court in Price relied in part on the decision in
Kaimowitz. id. at 263 n.12, 239 N.W.2d at 913 n.12, citing Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental
Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County, July 10, 1973). For a discussion of
the holding in Kaimowitz on the issue of consent, see notes 88-95 and accompanying text supra.
173. 307 Minn. at 263, 239 N.W.2d at 913.
174. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court thus rejected the distinction between psychosurgery
and electroshock therapy which the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research accepted in its report on psychosurgery. See note 24 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the distinction between psychosurgery and elec-
troshock therapy, see note 49 supra. See also New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Stein, 70
Misc. 2d 944, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1972) (patient, while sufficiently mentally ill to require further
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tient with certain enumerated rights, including a right to refuse
psychosurgery. 175  Other states prohibit the performance of psychosurgery
without the consent of the patient or, if the patient is incompetent, a third
party. 1 76  These regulatory schemes, however, do not establish any proce-
dures for determining the medical appropriateness of the surgery or for in-
suring that the patient's consent is both voluntary and informed. A limited
number of states, recognizing the difficulties involved, have provided for
judicial review of the proposed surgery.177  Only two states have statutory
requirements for mandatory review of any proposed psychosurgical proce-
dure. 17
8
In 1973, Oregon enacted the first comprehensive legislation for the reg-
ulation of psychosurgery. 17 9  The Oregon statute provides that
psychosurgery may be performed only if a Psychosurgery Review Board (Re-
view Board or Board) has approved the performance of the operation on the
individual patient. 180 The Review Board is composed of nine members ap-
pointed by the governor from specified medical, psychological, neuroscien-
tific, and lay backgrounds.' 8 '
A physician seeking to perform psychosurgery must first file a petition
with the Review Board stating that the patient or his legal guardian, if any,
has consented to the surgery and that the proposed treatment has "legiti-
mate clinical value" and is "needed" by the patient.' 8 2  Following notifica-
tion to the concerned parties, the Review Board must conduct a "consent
hearing" to determine whether the patient or legal guardian has given and
continues to give "voluntary and informed" consent183 to the treatment. If
175. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 23 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); S.C. CODE
§ 44-23-1010 (1977) (lobotomy only); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.370(9) (1975); Wis. STAT.
§ 51.61(k) (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
176. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5161(a)(2)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1978); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 91.5, § 1-8 (Cum. Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 59-2929(6) (1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
9 38-1322 (1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-55.6 (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
177. See, e.g., Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540 (E) (1974); IDAHO CODE §§ 66-346(a)(4),
66-346(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:4-24.2(d)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
178. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 426.705, 426.720 (1977).
179. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 426.700-760 (1977).
180. Id. § 426.705.
181. Id. § 426.750. Section 426.750(4) provides that all decisions of the Review Board must
be made by an affirmative vote of not less than six members. Id. It should be noted that at least
five, and as many as seven, members of the nine-person board may be physicians, while only
one need be an attorney and only one is designated as a "member of the general public." Id.
§ 426.750(3). The Review Board is thus heavily weighted toward the scientific community and
may approve the performance of psychosurgery even against the dissent of the lay members.
182. Id. § 426.710(1).
183. Id. § 426.715. Within 10 days of the filing of the petition, the Review Board must
schedule a hearing to be held within 20 days, and must give at least seven days notice of the
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the patient is believed to lack the capacity for voluntary and informed con-
sent and there is no legal guardian, the Review Board must request that one
be appointed. 184 The patient and guardian must be notified of their respec-
tive rights to legal representation at the consent hearing.
18 5
If the Review Board finds that adequate consent has been given, it must
then determine whether the proposed operation has clinical merit and is an
"appropriate" therapy for the specific patient.' 8 6  Before an operation may
be deemed appropriate, several prerequisites must be satisfied. It must be
shown that:
(a) All conventional therapies have been attempted;
(b) The criteria for selection of the patient have been met;
(c) The operation offers hope of saving life, reestablishing
health or alleviating suffering; and
hearing to the patient, the legal guardian, if any, the legal counsel, if any, and the petitioner.
Id. § 426.710(2).
Before the Board will determine that the consent given was voluntary and informed, it
must appear that:
(a) A fair explanation was made of the procedures to be followed, including an iden-
tification of those which are experimental;
(b) A description was given of the attendant discomforts and risks, if any;
(c) A description was given of the benefits to be expected, if any;
(d) A disclosure was made of appropriate alternative treatments, if any, that would be
advantageous for the subject;
(e) An offer was made to answer any inquiries concerning the treatment;
(f) Notice was given that the patient is free to withdraw his consent and to discon-
tinue the authorized treatment at any time;
(g) Disclosure was made of the relationship between the patient and the institution,
hospital or physician obtaining the consent; and
(h) Notice was given that the patient or his legal guardian, if any, had a right to
consult with and be advised or represented by legal counsel, and if he could not afford
one, legal counsel would be appointed for him pursuant to subsection (2) of ORS 426.735.
Id. § 426.715(2).
Section 426.715(5) provides that "[i]f the patient appears to be incapable of giving an in-
formed and voluntary consent to the proposed operation, the necessary consent shall be re-
quired to be given or withheld by the patient's legal guardian." Id. § 426.715(5). If the patient
has a legal guardian, the Board is thus required to review only the consent of that guardian.
The patient need not testify, and the Board may approve the procedure even if the prospective
patient specifically opposes it. Unlike Kainzowitz, therefore, the statute can be read as sanction-
ing the performance of psychosurgery on a nonconsenting, involuntarily committed mental pa-
tient under guardianship so long as six of the nine board members approve the procedure. See
note 287 infra.
184. OR. REv. STAT. § 426.730(1) (1977).
185. Id. § 426.715(2)(h). The Oregon statute further provides that indigent persons are enti-
tled to appointed counsel upon request. Id. § 426.735. Section 426.735(2) provides that if the
parent or legal guardian requests, but cannot afford, legal counsel, the circuit court shall ap-
point as counsel the county public defender, if one exists, or a member of the Oregon State
Bar. Id. § 426.735(2).
186. Id. § 426.720(1). This aspect of the review procedure is a two-step process: the Review
Board must first determine that the surgical procedure has "clinical merit" and then conclude
that the procedure is appropriate for the specified patient. Id.
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(d) All other viable alternative methods of treatment have
been tried and have failed to produce satisfactory results.
187
Finally, if the operation is permitted, a written report of its outcome must
be submitted to the Review Board.' 8 8 Throughout its brief history, the Re-
view Board has been an effective safeguard of the patient's rights.' 8 9
California has enacted two differing approaches to the regulation of
psychosurgery. The first involves the availability of psychosurgical therapies
to those persons who are involuntarily confined pursuant to the Penal Code,
wherever institutionalized. 90 The second approach concerns the perform-
ance of psychosurgery upon all other persons, whether institutionalized or
not. 191
The preamble to the penal legislation declares the state's policy to be
the protection of the patient's constitutional rights of privacy and freedom of
thought from interference by imposed "organic" therapies. 192  California,
unlike Oregon, 1 93 does not recognize proxy or guardian consent to
psychosurgery; rather, the performance of psychosurgery upon individuals
who lack the capacity to render informed consent 194 is prohibited.
1 95
Both California statutes recognize that a person under guardianship,
having been adjudicated legally incompetent as a general matter, may
nevertheless retain the specific capacity for informed consent to
187. id.. § 426.720(3). The Review Board may conduct site visits with experts in the field
during the course of its deliberations. Id. § 426.720(2). Furthermore, the Board may undertake
a specific diagnostic evaluation to aid in its determination. Id. § 426.720(4).
188. Id. § 426.740. It should be noted that § 677.190(23) of the Oregon statutes provides that
the performance of psychosurgery or intracranial brain stimulation without the permission of the
Review Board constitutes grounds for the suspension or revocation of a license to practice
medicine. OR. REV. STAT. § 677.190(23) (1977).
189. G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ & B. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
229-31 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANNAS]. During the first four years of its operation, the
Board reviewed five cases, rejecting three petitions and suspending the other two pending
appointment of a guardian or reapplication. Id.
190. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2670-2680 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
191. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325-5328.9 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). It was an earlier
version of this legislation which was attacked as unconstitutional in Aden. For a discussion of
Aden, see notes 133-57 and accompanying text supra. In the fall of 1976, the Governor of
California signed into law the current statute, which was designed to meet the Aden court's
objections. 1976 Cal. Stats. ch. 1109. See ANNAS, supra note 189, at 228. For a discussion of
the court's objections to the original statute, see notes 145 & 146 and accompanying text supra.
192. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2670 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). The term organic therapy is de-
fined as:
(1) Psychosurgery, including lobotomy, stereotactic surgery, electronic, chemical or
other destruction of brain tissues, or implantation of electrodes into brain tissue.
(2) Shock therapy, including but not limited to any convulsive therapy and insulin
shock treatments.
(3) The use of any drugs, electric shocks, electronic stimulation of the brain, or inflic-
tion of physical pain when used as an aversive or reinforcing stimulus in a program of
aversive, classical or operant conditioning.
Id. § 2670.5(c).
193. OR. REV. STAT. § 426.715(5) (1977). See notes 183 & 184 and accompanying text supra.
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psychosurgery.196  Conversely, an otherwise legally competent patient may
lack such capacity and would therefore be ineligible for psychosurgery.
1 97
The distinctive feature of the California penal legislation is its provision
for mandatory judicial review. 198 The warden or superintendent of the con-
fining institution must petition a court for an order authorizing
psychosurgery, specifying the "mental illness, disorder, abnormality, or de-
fect [that] justifies" the psychosurgery.' 99 If the inmate is indigent, the
194. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2672 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). Section 2672 of the Penal Code
provides:
(a) For purposes of this article, "informed consent" means that a person must know-
ingly and intelligently, without duress and coercion, and clearly and explicitly manifest his
consent to the proposed organic therapy to the attending physician.
(b) A person confined shall not be deemed incapable of informed consent solely by
virtue of being diagnosed as a mentally ill, disordered, abnormal or mentally defective
person.
(c) A person confined shall be deemed incapable of informed consent if such person
cannot understand, or knowingly and intelligently act upon, the information specified in
Section 2673.
(d) A person confined shall be deemed incapable of informed consent if for any
reason he cannot manifest his consent to the attending physician.
Id. Section 2673 of the Penal Code requires that the subject of the surgery be given certain
information:
(a) For purposes of this article, "informed consent" requires that the attending physi-
cian directly communicate with the person and clearly and explicitly provide all the fol-
lowing information prior to the person's decision:
(1) The nature and seriousness of the person's illness, disorder or defect.
(2) The nature of the proposed organic therapy and its intended duration.
(3) The likelihood of improvement or deterioration, temporary or permanent, without
the administration of the proposed organic therapy.
(4) The likelihood and degree of improvement, remission, control, or cure resulting
from the administration of such organic therapy, and the likelihood, nature, and extent of
changes in and intrusions upon the person's personality and patterns of behavior and
thought or mentation and the degree to which these changes may be 'irreversible. This
information shall indicate the probable duration and intensity of such therapy and
whether such therapy may have to be continued indefinitely for optimum therapeutic
results.
(5) The likelihood, nature, extent, and duration of side effects of the proposed or-
ganic therapy, and how and to what extent they may be controlled, if at all.
(6) The uncertainty of the benefits and hazards of the proposed organic therapy be-
cause of the lack of sufficient data available to the medical profession, or any other reason
for such uncertainty.
(7) The reasonable alternative organic therapy or psychotherapeutic modality of
therapy, or nonorganic behavior modification programs, and why the organic therapy rec-
ommended is the therapy of choice. These alternatives shall be described and explained
to the person in the manner specified in this section.
(8) Whether the proposed therapy is generally regarded as sound by the medical
profession, or is considered experimental.
Id. § 2673.
195. Id. § 2670.5(b). See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6(a) (West Cum. Supp.
1978) (providing that psychosurgery, wherever administered, may be performed only if the pa-
tient gives written informed consent).
196. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2672(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 5326.5(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
197. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2 672(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 5326.5(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
198. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2675 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
199. Id. § 2675(a),(b).
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court must appoint both an independent medical expert and a public defen-
der to assist the inmate.200 Initially, the court must determine whether the
person has the capacity for informed consent and has manifested that capac-
ity in the process of consenting to the proposed psychosurgery. 20 ' If the
court so finds, it must then review the merits of the proposed operation.
2 0 2
To authorize psychosurgery, the court must find that the operation would be
"beneficial," that there is a "compelling interest justifying" the operation,
that there are "no less onerous alternatives," and that the operation "is in
accordance with sound medical-psychiatric practice." 21
By comparison, the nonpenal California legislation does not require judi-
cial review of proposed psychosurgery for persons outside the criminal jus-
tice system. The legislation relies instead upon a committee's review of both
the patient's consent and the merits of the operation.2 0 4  After personally
examining the patient and determining that the patient has the capacity for
informed consent,20 5 the committee must agree with the attending physician
that "all other appropriate treatment modalities have been exhausted," and
that the operation "is definitely indicated and is the least drastic alternative
200. Id. § 2677.
201. Id. § 2 679(a). The consent of the patient must be established by "clear and convincing
evidence." Id.
202. Id. § 2679(c).
203. Id. The judicial review provisions of the California penal legislation were utilized in
1976 when Edmund Kemper, a prisoner at the California Medical Facility at Vacaville,
petitioned for permission to undergo stereotactic psychosurgery. Kemper's original petition was
denied by the court with the understanding that if compliance with the statutory requirements
could be demonstrated, the request would be given further consideration. In re Organic
Therapy for Edmund Emil Kemper III, No. 11422 (Solano County Super. Ct., Cal., June 3,
1976) (order assigning public defender). Subsequently, Kemper filed an application for
psychosurgery which was denied by the Superior Court on the ground that no showing had
been made that psychosurgery would benefit the recipient. In re Application of Edmund E.
Kemper for Writ of Habeas Corpus, No. 11422 (Solano County Super. Ct., Cal., August 31,
1977) (order). The Kemper case and the California penal legislation are discussed in Comment,
Prisoner Access to Psychosurgery: A Constitutional Perspective, 9 PAC. L. J. 249, 251 (1978).
204. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). Section 5326.6 provides
in pertinent part:
Psychosurgery, wherever administered, may be performed only if:
(c) The attending physician gives adequate documentation entered into the patient's
treatment record of the reasons for the procedure, that all other appropriate treatment
modalities have been exhausted and that this mode of treatment is definitely indicated
and is the least drastic alternative available for the treatment of the patient at the time.
Such statement in the treatment record shall be signed by the attending and treating
physician or physicians.
(d) Three physicians, one appointed by the facility and two appointed by the local
mental health director, two of whom shall be either board-certified or eligible psychia-
trists or board-certified or eligible neurosurgeons, have personally examined the patient
and unanimously agree with the attending physicians' determinations pursuant to subdivi-
sion (c) and agree that the patient has the capacity to give informed consent. Such agree-
ment shall be documented in the patient's treatment record and signed by each such
physician.
Id. § 5326.6(c), (d).
205. Id. § 5326.6(d). See note 204 supra. The informed consent requirements are as follows:
(a) For purposes of this chapter, "written informed consent" means that a person
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available" for treatment at that time. 20 6  In addition, no psychosurgery may
be performed for at least seventy-two hours after the patient's written con-
sent. 207
C. Federal Administrative Regulations
At the present time, there are no federal regulations specifically govern-
ing the performance of psychosurgery in the United States. The Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), however, has been active in reg-
knowingly and intelligently, without duress or coercion, clearly and explicitly manifests
consent to the proposed therapy to the treating physician and in writing on the standard
consent form prescribed in Section 5326.4.
(b) The physician may urge the proposed treatment as the best one, but may not
use, in an effort to gain consent, any reward or threat, express or implied, nor any other
form of inducement or coercion, including, but not limited to, placing the patient in a
more restricted setting, transfer of the patient to another facility, or loss of the patient's
hospital privileges. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed as in conflict with Sec-
tion 5326.2. No one shall be denied any benefits for refusing treatment.
(c) A person confined shall be deemed incapable of written informed consent if such
person cannot understand, or knowingly and intelligently act upon, the information
specified in Section 5326.2.
(d) A person confined shall not be deemed incapable of refusal solely by virtue of
being diagnosed as a mentally ill, disordered, abnormal, or mentally defective person.
(e) Written informed consent shall be given only after 24 hours have elapsed from
the time the information in Section 5326.2 has been given.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). Section 5326.2 provides:
To constitute voluntary informed consent, the following information shall be given to
the patient. in a clear and explicit manner:
(a) The reason for treatment, that is, the nature and seriousness of the patient's ill-
ness. disorder or defect.
(b) The nature of the procedures to be used in the proposed treatment, including its
probable frequency and duration.
(c) The probable degree and duration (temporary or permanent) of improvement or
remission, expected with or without such treatment.
(d) The nature, degree, duration, and the probability of the side effects and signifi-
cant risks, commonly known by the medical profession, of such treatment, including its
adjuvants, especially noting the degree and duration of memory loss (including its
irreversibility) and how and to what extent they may be controlled, if at all.
(e) That there exists a division of opinion as to the efficacy of the proposed treat-
ment, why and how it works and its commonly known risks and side effects.
(f) The reasonable alternative treatments, and why the physician is recommending
this particular treatment.
(g) That the patient has the right to accept or refuse the proposed treatment, and
that if he or she consents, has the right to revoke his or her consent for any reason, at any
time prior to or between treatments.
Id. § 5326.2. Compare these informational requirements with the requirements of the California
penal legislation, CAL. PENAL CODE § 2673 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). For the text of § 2673,
see note 194 supra. For the informational requirements of the Oregon legislation, see note 183
supra. For a discussion of the requirements imposed by the Nuernberg Code, as adopted by
the Michigan court in Kaimowitz, see note 90 supra.
206. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1978). With respect to the
appropriateness of psychosurgery as a form of treatment, § 5326.6(d) expressly prohibits the
performance of psychosurgery upon minors under the age of 18 years. Id. See also TENN. CODE
ANN. § 33-320(f) (1977) (prohibiting surgical procedures on minors for the treatment of mental,
emotional, or behavioral disorders).
207. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
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ulating experimentation on human beings. HEW proposed 20  and adopted
regulations for the protection of human subjects. 20 9  These regulations be-
came effective on July 30, 1974,210 and extend to "all Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare grants and contracts supporting research, develop-
ment, and related activities in which human subjects are involved." 211
Since the regulations only extend to research activity funded by HEW,
2 12
however, and since most psychosurgery is performed in the context of clini-
cal practice, 2 13 these regulations are not applicable to most of the
psychosurgery currently being performed in the United States. 2 14
In 1977, the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research released its report and recommenda-
tions concerning the use of psychosurgery. 21 5  The Commission deter-
mined 216 that psychosurgery may be effective in treating certain disorders
and relieving certain symptoms, 2 17 and therefore concluded that
psychosurgery should not be absolutely banned. 2 18 Limitations on
psychosurgery were recommended, however, because of the potential mis-
use of psychosurgery for social control and the concern for the safety of a
208. 38 Fed. Reg. 27,882 (1973).
209. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.122 (1978). Recognizing the dif-
ficulties involved in obtaining informed consent from prisoners, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare has adopted specific regulations pertaining to research involving prison-
ers as subjects. 43 Fed. Reg. 53,652-56 (1978) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 46.301-.306). The
same considerations have also prompted HEW to propose regulations pertaining to research
involving children, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,786-95 (1978), and those institutionalized as mentally dis-
abled. 43 Fed. Reg. 53,950-56 (1978).
210. 39 Fed. Reg. 18,914 (1974).
211. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1978). Under the regulations, initial and continuing review of the
projects by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the institution conducting the research is
required as a condition to receiving federal funding. Id. § 46.102(a), (d). Each IRB must be
composed of "not less than five persons with varying backgrounds" who must be identified to
HEW. Id. § 46.106(b)(1)-(2). A summary of the proposed research, along with documentation of
informed consent, must be submitted to HEW in advance of the project. Id. §§ 46.106(c)-(e),
46.110.
212. Hearings, supra note 20, at 343. HEW has ceased funding of research in the bio-
behavioral control field. Note, supra note 26, at 619. Most of the studies are now aimed at
"understanding the behavioral consequences of altered brain function as a result of war injury,
accident, disease, or surgery performed because of clinical necessity, such as removal of malig-
nant brain tumors." Hearings, supra note 20, at 341 (testimony of Dr. Bertram Brown).
213. E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 296; Mearns, supra note 16, at 599-600. Because
most psychosurgery is performed in the context of clinical practice, a formal research protocol
and review is not considered necessary by the physicians performing the surgery. See note 16
supra. E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 16, at 296; Mearns, supra note 16, at 599-600.
214. Hearings, supra note 20, at 341 (testimony of Dr. Bertram Brown).
215. REPORT, supra note 6. For a discussion of the Commission's organization and mandate,
see notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
216. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 57-70. Two of the Commission's recommendations concern
psychosurgery performed on adult patients voluntarily residing in mental institutions and the
treatment of minors, and will not be discussed further in this comment.
217. REPORT, supra note 6, at 58-59.
218. Id. at 59. Pennsylvania, however, through the rules and regulations of the Department
of Public Welfare, has categorized psychosurgery as a prohibited procedure. 8 PA. BULL. 2443
(Sept. 2, 1978).
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patient in an operation which, while potentially therapeutic, is not an ac-
cepted procedure.2 19  The Commission believed that safeguards against
these dangers could be provided by an Institutional Review Board (IRB),
whose composition and procedures must be approved by HEW.2 2 0 Accord-
ing to the Commission's recommendations, the IRB would assess: 1) the
competence of the surgeon; 2) the plans for the evaluation of the treatment;
3) the diagnostic evaluation of the patient's fitness for psychosurgery; and 4)
the informed consent of the patient.
2 2 '
The Commission also proposed conditions precedent to the performance
of psychosurgery on patients who are involuntarily confined and/or lack the
capacity to give informed consent.2 22  Recognizing a right to treatment,
2 23
219. REPORT, supra note 6, at 59.
220. Id. at 59-61.
221. Id. A subcommittee of IRB members or consultants, approved by HEW and including a
neurosurgeon, a psychiatrist, a neurologist, and a psychologist, would review the technical as-
pects of the proposed psychosurgery - that is, the competence of the operating surgeon to
perform the operation, the evaluation procedures, and the diagnostic evaluation of the surgical
candidate. Id. at 60. The IRB as a whole would review the consent of the patient, focusing on
the procedures employed for obtaining consent as well as the circumstances of the actual con-
sent given by the patient. Id. Provisions protecting the privacy of the patient, such as anonym-
ity and closed hearings, are also provided. Id. at 61.
222. REPORT, supra note 6, at 64. The Commission's recommendation stated:
A psychosurgical procedure should not be performed on an adult patient who (i) is a
prisoner, (ii) is involuntarily committed to a mental institution, (iii) has a legal guardian of
the person, or (iv) is believed by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) to be incapable of
giving informed consent to such procedure, unless all of the following conditions are satis-
fied: (A) A National Psychosurgery Advisory Board has determined that the specific
psychosurgical procedure has demonstrable benefit for the treatment of an individual with
the psychiatric symptom or disorder of the patient; (B) If the operation is to be performed
as a part of a research project, the conditions set forth in the Commission s report on
research involving prisoners or report on research involving the institutionalized mentally
infirm, as applicable, are fulfilled; (C) The conditions of Recommendation (1) are fulfilled
at the institution where the operation is to be performed, and such institution is separate
from any prison or institution where the patient is regularly confined; (D) The patient has
given informed consent or, if the patient is believed by the IRB to be incapable of giving
informed consent, the patient's guardian of the person has given informed consent and
the patient does not object; and (E) A court in which the patient had legal representation
has approved the performance of the operation.
Id. For the report of the Commission on research involving prisoners, see NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RE-
SEARCH, RESEARCH INVOLVING PISONERS (1976), (Sup. Doe. No. Y3.H88:2P93). For the re-
port of the Commission on research involving those institutionalized as mentally infirm, see
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BE-
HAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH INVOLVING THOSE INSTITUTIONALIZED AS MENTALLY INFIRM
(1978) (Sup. Doc. No. Y3.H88:21n7).
223. REPORT, supra note 6, at 67. The Report stated:
The Commission agrees with the Kaimowitz opinion that institutionalization may diminish
the ability of prisoners and mental patients to make free choices by removing oppor-
tunities for asserting or exercising self-determination. On the other hand, it seems unfair
to exclude prisoners or involuntarily confined patients from the opportunity to seek ben-
efit from new therapies on the basis of an unrebuttable presumption of diminished capac-
ity or by prohibiting third party consent.
Id. For a general discussion of the right to treatment, see note 140 supra.
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the Commission maintained that such individuals should be allowed access
to psychosurgical procedures.2 2 4  The Commission concluded that, in addi-
tion to the physical dangers thought to be associated with psychosurgery, the
possibilities of coercion and behavior modification for the purpose of institu-
tional control are inherent in the situation of the involuntarily confined indi-
vidual.2 2 5  To safeguard against these dangers, the Commission recom-
mended a three-level review mechanism for approving the performance of
psychosurgery on these individuals.
226
On the first level of review, a national psychosurgery advisory board
would determine the potential benefit to the patient of the proposed proce-
dure. 227  The second and third levels of review would be conducted by the
IRB and the courts, respectively.2 2 8  In addition to the usual functions of
the IRB, 2 29 the review would take place at an institution in which the pa-
tient was not involuntarily confined.2 30  The review by the IRB and the
courts would focus on possible inducements to psychosurgery as a condition
of probation, parole, reduction of sentence, or release.2 3 ' Under no cir-
cumstances, however, would psychosurgery be performed if the patient ob-
jected to the procedure, even if all three levels of review had approved the
procedure and the guardian of the patient had consented.2 32
224. REPORT, supra note 6, at 64.
225. Id. at 64-65.
226. Id. at 64-66.
227. Id. at 65. The process of national review would be initiated at the request of the sur-
geon wishing to perform the psychosurgery. Id. The Commission stated:
[T]he determination of demonstrable benefit by the Psychosurgery Advisory Board should
be made on the basis of (1) the use of the specific psychosurgical procedure to treat the
particular disorder in patients who are not prisoners, institutionalized, under guardian-
ship, or believed incapable of giving informed consent, (2) treatment of such persons who
underwent the procedure prior to 1977 or outside the United States, or (3) when neither
of the above approaches are feasible, persuasive scientific evidence or rationale to support
a belief that the procedure is likely to alleviate the specific disorder.
id.
228 Id. at 65. "Following approval by the Psychosurgery Advisory Board, the surgeon may
initiate review by the appropriate IRB. Following IRB approval, court review is initiated by a
representative of the patient for whom surgery is proposed." Id.
229. See notes 220 & 221 and accompanying text supra.
230. REPORT, supra note 6, at 64-65.
231. Id. at 66.
232. Id. at 64, 66. With respect to the issue of guardian consent, the Commission noted that
such consent should be reviewed with an awareness of the potential for conflicts of interest
inherent in such third-party involvement. Id. at 66. The Commission recommended that the
guardian should not be associated with the institution where the patient is confined or where
the operation is to be performed. Id. Consent by a legal guardian of a patient who is not
institutionalized, but who is incapable of giving informed consent, should also be scrutinized to
take into account the potential conflicts of interest that may be associated with the responsibility
of providing care for such persons. Id.
If the IRB has good reason to believe that a patient, lacking a legal guardian, is incapable of
giving informed consent, the IRB should withhold approval pending authorization by a court
and consent of a court appointed legal guardian. Id. If no court accepts jurisdiction, however,
the operation should not be performed. Id. Similarly, the Commission deferred to those states
which prohibit third-party consent, concluding that the operation should not be performed if
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IV. REFINING THE LEGAL RESPONSE
The judicial, 23 3 legislative234 and administrative235 responses to
psychosurgery consist of widely divergent opinions within the legal commu-
nity. A number of states, by requiring the formality of informed consent with-
out providing procedures to evaluate the legal adequacy of the consent,
23 6
have adopted a laissez-faire approach to the regulation of psychosurgery.
Conversely, some jurisdictions have adopted a prohibitive approach, banning
psychosurgery with respect to entire classes of patients and institutions.
23 7
Between these extremes, a variety of regulatory schemes have been
adopted.
Due to this diversity of opinion and approach, two initial observations
must be made before any detailed analysis of the law's response to
psychosurgery can be attempted. First, it is submitted that an absolute pro-
hibition of psychosurgery is not justifiable. Such a restriction denies the pa-
tient access to the potential benefits of psychosurgery 2 3 8 and is in conflict
with the right to treatment. 23 9 One difficulty in applying a right to treat-
ment analysis to psychosurgery is that psychosurgical procedures are still
considered "experimental" by segments of the medical 240 and legal 241 coln-
the patient objects to the procedure. Id. For a further discussion of the Commission's report,
see Note, Return to the Cuckoo's Nest: An Examination of the National Commission's Report on
Psychosurgery, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941 (1978).
In November of 1978, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
published a determination regarding the Commission's report and recommendations concerning
psychosurgery. 43 Fed. Reg. 53,242 (1978). The Secretary concluded that under present law,
HEW had no "clear authority" to regulate directly psychosurgical procedures currently being
performed in the United States. Id. at 53,243. Furthermore, based on the Commission's find-
ings concerning the nature of psychosurgery, the Secretary concluded that an effort to secure
regulatory legislation would not be warranted. Id. In lieu of regulatory legislation, it was deter-
mined that HEW would assist leading professional organizations in forming a Joint Committee
on Psychosurgery to establish mechanisms for the voluntary regulation and reporting of
psychosurgical procedures. Id. Furthermore, HEW will promulgate regulations covering proce-
dures supported by HEW programs. Id. These regulations will generally follow the Commis-
sion's recommendations, but would ban the use of psychosurgery on prisoners, children, in-
voluntarily confined mental patients, legally incompetent patients, and any patient who, in the
judgment of the attending physician, is not competent to give informed consent. Id. at 53,243-
44.
233. For a discussion of the judicial response to psychosurgery, see notes 67-174 and accom-
panying text supra.
234. For a discussion of the legislative response to psychosurgery, see notes 175-207 and
accompanying text supra.
235. For a discussion of the administrative response to psychosurgery, see notes 208-32 and
accompanying text supra.
236. See notes 175-77 and accompanying text supra.
237. See, e.g., Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir.
Ct., Wayne County, July 10, 1973); Wyatt v. Hardin, [July-August 1976] 1 MENTAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 55 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 28, 1975), modified, No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala. July 1, 1975). For a
discussion of Kaimowitz, see notes 67-107 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the
litigation which culminated in the order in Wyatt v. Hardin, see notes 108-30 and accompanying
text supra.
238. See note 16 supra.
239. For a general discussion of the right to treatment, see note 140 supra.
240. See note 16 supra.
241. See notes 78-87 and accompanying text supra, and note 144 supra.
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munities. Even assuming, however, that psychosurgery is a treatment of last
resort, if all indications for surgery are present, any lesser treatment
employed where surgery is indicated may be less than constitutionally
adequate.2 42  Furthermore, any general prohibition of psychosurgery will
necessarily limit the physician's ability to pursue his vocation of medical
practice and research. Such a limitation may result in a deprivation of the
physician's right to liberty under the fourteenth amendment. 243 Finally,
although the probability of permanent side effects remains high, 244 benefits
have been realized from psychosurgery245 and those benefits may be in-
creased by future technological advances. 24 6 It is therefore submitted that
while the dangers from psychosurgery clearly justify some degree of regula-
tion, 2 4 7 no similarly compelling state interest justifies a prohibition of
psychosurgery in derogation of the right to treatment.
Second, it is submitted that a "hands-off' approach to psychosurgery,
which relies on the "high standards of the medical profession and the indi-
viduals who compose it" for protection, 24 is equally unacceptable. Implicit
in the judicial response to psychosurgery is the assumption that such surgery
intrudes upon the individual's physical and mental integrity and that the
individual is protected under the Constitution from such intrusions. 249  It is
submitted, however, that the current constitutional analysis is unfocused
since it is presently unclear whether the protected interests which trigger a
more rigorous review of the individual's consent 250 are grounded in the
right of privacy or in the freedom of speech and thought found in the first
amendment.
242. Peters & Lee, Psychosurgery: A Case for Regulation, 1978 DET. C.L. REV. 383, 395
(1978).
243. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the United States Supreme
Court overturned a state statute which prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to children
who had not yet reached the eighth grade. Id. at 402-03. The Court based its conclusion, in
part, on the fact that the statute interfered with the teacher's right to pursue his chosen profes-
sion. Id. at 400. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198-200 (1973).
244. See notes 86 & 87 supra.
245. See note 16 supra.
246. Compare notes 38 & 44 supra (discussing the benefits achieved through the per-
formance of lobotomies) with note 16 supra (discussing the benefits achieved with more
contemporary psychosurgical procedures).
247. For a discussion of the compelling state interests cited by the Aden court to justify the
regulation of psychosurgery, see notes 143 & 144 and accompanying text supra; note 147 supra.
248. See Note, supra note 58, at 474. See notes 58-62 and accompanying text supra.
249. See notes 96-107 & 138-46 and accompanying text supra.
250. It has already been noted that the patient's consent to a psychosurgical procedure is
tantamount to a waiver of constitutionally protected interests and it is for that reason that a
strict review of the patient's consent is required. See notes 88-90 & 107 and accompanying text
supra.
Both the Kaimowitz and the Aden courts stated that further technological advances in
psychosurgical procedures, which result in increased scientific validation of the procedure, could
result in a less restrictive approach to psychosurgery. See notes 95 & 154 supra. It is submitted,
however, that any technological advances in procedure, while reducing the physical dangers of
psychosurgery, will do nothing to lessen the intrusion into the constitutionally protected in-
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A. An Analysis of the Constitutional Considerations
The Kaimowitz court proposed two alternative constitutional theories to
support its nonrecognition of Smith's consent, concluding that the use of
experimental psychosurgery on a mental patient involuntarily confined in a
state institution, even with the patient's formal consent, would violate the
patient's first amendment right to generate ideas as well as his constitution-
ally protected right of privacy.2 51 These same alternative constitutional
theories were also advanced by the petitioners in Aden .252
With respect to the right of privacy, the Kaimowitz court maintained
that this protected interest would be violated by a psychosurgical intrusion
into the intellect of the patient. 253  Citing recent Supreme Court decisions
involving privacy, 254 the Kaimowitz court held that an individual's mental
processes are protected by the right of privacy 255 and that an authorization
of surgery would "fail to recognize and follow the mandates of the Supreme
Court of the United States, which has constitutionally protected the privacy
of body and mind." 256  It is submitted, however, that the privacy argu-
ments of Kaimowitz and the right of privacy as applied to psychosurgery are
unsupported by current constitutional standards.
The threshold question with respect to the applicability of the privacy
concept is whether judicial opinions in the privacy area, such as Roe v.
Wade 257 and Griswold v. Connecticut,2 58  can be applied to the
psychosurgery issues. Rights pertaining to privacy in Roe and Griswold were
directed toward prohibiting state regulation of activity alleged to be private
and a matter of personal choice. 259  The Supreme Court's analysis in the
privacy area has not focused on the individual's right to exercise control over
his body or mind per se. Indeed, the Court in Roe stated:
The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be abso-
lute. In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some
amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one
terests of the patient. Due to the protected nature of the patient's interests, improved technol-
ogy will not support a relaxation of regulation. See Annas, supra note 75, at 11.
251. JUDIcIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 520-23. See notes 96-107 and accompanying text
supra.
252. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 679-80, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546-47. See notes 138-42 and accompanying
text supra.
253. See notes 97 & 104-07 and accompanying text supra.
254. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (procuring
or performing an abortion); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (possessing obscene mate-
rials in the home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1962) (prescribing, selling, and using
contraceptives). A similar privacy analysis was noted by the California court in Aden. See note
139 and accompanying text supra.
255. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 523.
256. Id.
257. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
258. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
259. See note 254 supra.
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pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously
articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court has refused to rec-
ognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past.
260
A second difficulty with the privacy analysis is that it makes an alleged
violation of the right of privacy virtually indistinguishable from the tort of
battery. 26  There is nothing in the privacy analysis to distinguish
psychosurgery from any unwarranted interference with one's "personal in-
tegrity." 262 It is submitted that the right of privacy would no more be
violated by the performance of psychosurgery than by subjecting a patient to
any other intentional and unpermitted contact. Under the privacy analysis of
psychosurgery, the right to privacy becomes superfluous as an unnecessary
duplication of the rights already available under tort law.
263
It is submitted that a first amendment analysis of the interests to be
protected by psychosurgery regulation is a more convincing alternative than
the privacy argument. The premises of the first amendment analysis are that
certain mental activity precedes communication, that psychosurgery is
treatment altering mental activity that may be necessary to communication,
and that protection of communication is meaningless unless the first amend-
ment also protects the activity which makes communication possible. 264
The conclusion which follows from these premises is that the protection af-
forded by the first amendment includes a right to refuse treatment which
alters the mental activity essential to communication, as well as right of ac-
cess to treatment which alters the same activity.
265
260. 410 U.S. at 154, citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination).
261. Comment, supra note 79, at 219. Dean Prosser defined the interest protected by the
law of battery as "[tihe interest in freedom from intentional and unpermitted contacts with the
plaintiffs person. ... W. PROssER, LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971).
262. W. PROSSER, supra note 261, at 35.
263. Comment, supra note 79, at 219. One commentator has maintained that tort law pro-
vided a sufficient basis for the holding in Kaimowitz, and that the court should not have en-
gaged in a constitutional analysis. The Devil's Advocate, 2 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 64,
65 (1974).
264. Shapiro, supra note 55, at 256. Professor Shapiro formulated the argument in the follow-
ing manner:
(1) The first amendment protects communication of virtually all kinds, whether in writ-
ten, verbal, pictorial or any symbolic form, and whether cognitive or emotive in na-
ture.
(2) Communication entails the transmission and reception of whatever is communicated.
(3) Transmission and reception necessarily involve mentation on the part of both the per-
son transmitting and the person receiving.
(4) It is in fact impossible to distinguish in advance mentation which will be involved in
or necessary to transmission and reception from mentation which will not.
(5) If communication is to be protected, all mentation (regardless of its potential involve-
ment in transmission or reception) must therefore be protected.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
265. Id. at 257. Professor Shapiro concluded his analysis as follows:
(6) Organic therapy intrusively alters or interferes with mentation.
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The right to refuse treatment implies that coerced psychosurgery consti-
tutes violation of first amendment rights. Coercion includes not only the
performance of psychosurgery against the patient's will, but also subjecting a
patient to psychosurgery without having obtained his informed consent.266 It
was this latter aspect of the first amendment argument that concerned the
court in Kaimowitz,2 67 where the court held that since institutionalization
prevents competent, knowledgeable, and voluntary consent, it thereby ob-
viates informed consent to psychosurgery.2 68 In Kaimowitz, no compelling
state interest could be found to support the violation of this first amendment
right.
2 6 9
The right of access to treatment as an aspect of first amendment rights
to free speech and thought was recognized in Aden. 2 7 0  The Aden court
maintained that first amendment freedoms may be impaired by the lack of
access to psychosurgery, 271 and that a compelling state interest must be
shown to justify a limitation of access and a denial of first amendment
rights.
272
B. Technical Refinements in Psychosurgery:
Review Procedures
In evaluating the procedures adopted by those jurisdictions which have
established mandatory review of a decision to perform a psychosurgical pro-
cedure,2 73 it should be noted initially that the review procedure is con-
(7) The first amendment therefore protects persons against enforced alteration or interfer-
ence with their mentation by coerced organic therapy. (This last proposition would
also be a valid inference if it read: "The first amendment therefore protects persons
against certain kinds of denial of access to organic therapy, or psychoactive agents
generally, which are used to alter mentation.").
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
266. See Note, supra note 25, at 1022.
267. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 521-22. See notes 98-103 and accompanying text
supra.
268. See notes 88-95 and accompanying text supra. But see note 95 supra.
269. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 522. See notes 106 & 107 and accompanying text
supra. Allowing the performance of psychosurgery without the informed consent of the patient
may further two possible state interests: 1) a reduction in the cost of confinement; and 2)
paternalism-benefiting the patient by altering his mental activity to function in such a way that
"normal" communication is possible. Shapiro, supra note 55, at 277. These interests, however,
may lack the status of "compelling" so as not to outweigh the serious intrusion on the patient's
first amendment rights. Id. at 277-96.
270. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 679, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 545-46. See note 138 and accompanying text
supra.
271. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 679-80, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546-57. See notes 141 & 149 and accom-
panying text supra.
272. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 679-80, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 546-47. As has been noted, the Aden court
found a compelling state interest to support the state's regulation of psychosurgery. See notes
143 & 144 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 147-56 and accompanying text supra.
273. See, e.g., Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 262-63, 239 N.W.2d 905, 913 (1976); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325-5328.9 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 426.700-
.760 (1977). See also notes 219-21 and accompanying text supra.
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ducted on two separate and distinct levels: medical and legal. 2 74 In spite of
the dual nature of the review process, the evaluation is generally conducted
by a single board or committee. 275 It is submitted that the review functions
should be separated and delegated to two distinct committees.
The first review board, which would consist of appointed members of
the related medical fields, 276 would review the technical aspects of the pro-
posed psychosurgery, such as the competence of the operating surgeon to
perform the operation, the evaluation procedure, and the diagnostic evalua-
tion of the surgical candidate. 2 77  The medical review board would then
make a determination concerning the medical justifications for the proposed
surgery and the fitness of the candidate for the specific procedure. The deci-
sion of the medical review committee would be final and would not be sub-
ject to judicial review. This policy recognizes the complexity of the medical
judgment involved and the judiciary's inability to effectively review such a
determination. 278  To mitigate the possiblity of abuse, however, it is
suggested that the medical review committee be a permanent, centralized
body. 279 With a single committee reviewing all proposed psychosurgery
within a given state, the possiblity of the development of conflicts of interest
between members of the committee and those actively engaged in the prac-
tice of psychosurgery would be minimized.
28 0
The second review committee, consisting of lay persons, members of
the bar, or a combination of the two, 281 would review the legal adequacy of
274. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 426.710(1), 426.715 (1977). See also note 221 and accompanying text supra.
275. See note 274 supra. The Kaimowitz case may provide an illustration of the problems
involved in having only one committee perform both review functions. One member of the
review committee in Kaimowitz failed to attend any of the meetings relating to the proposed
surgery, stating: "As a layman I am unqualified to comment on any of the technical aspects
which are involved in the project. Therefore we must all trust the good intentions and technical
competence of the Hospital Medical Committee, psychologist, psychiatrists, neurologists, etc.,
who have reviewed and evaluated John Doe's case." Letter from Frank Moran, Complaint,
exhibit F, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
Wayne County, July 10, 1973), reprinted in part in Annas, supra note 189, at 221. Further-
more, relying on untrained laymen to make decisions concerning the advisability of a proposed
psychosurgical procedure could arguably constitute medical malpractice on the part of the re-
view committee. See note 62 supra.
276. For example, psychiatry, psychology, neurology, and neurosurgery should be rep-
resented on the medical review board.
277. REPORT, supra note 6, at 60. In reviewing the fitness of the proposed surgical candi-
date, the medical review board, through personal interviews with the candidate, could aid the
patient in making an informed decision by acting as a neutral and authoritative body from which
the patient could receive answers to his or her questions about the proposed procedure. Annas,
supra note 189, at 231.
278. See text accompanying notes 129 & 130 supra.
279. This is the procedure adopted in Oregon. See OR. REV. STAT. § 426.750 (1977). This
procedure was not, however, adopted in California. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6(d)
(West Cum. Supp. 1978).
280. As a further precaution against possible conflicts of interest, individuals currently en-
gaged in the practice of psychosurgery should be excluded from membership on the medical
review committee.
281. Since the consent review board would be quasi-judicial in nature, it may be advisable to
restrict membership to attorneys. Since the board, however, would be making a determination
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the consent given by the proposed subject of the psychosurgical procedure.
This consent review committee would evaluate the knowledge and compe-
tency of the patient,2 82 the procedures employed in obtaining the con-
sent, 2 3 and the voluntariness of the patient's action. 28 4  Since the consent
review committee's determination would be legal in nature, judicial review
of its decision should be permitted. Moreover, in light of its purpose, it is
suggested that the functions of the consent review committee also be cen-
tralized 28 5 and that a requirement of unanimity be imposed on the determi-
nations of both the medical review committee and the consent review com-
mittee.
286
A second area requiring clarification is the extent to which a third party
can consent to the performance of psychosurgery when it is determined that
a patient lacks the capacity to provide the necessary consent. Although a
number of states currently provide for various forms of third-party con-
sent,28 7 the use of such consent is highly questionable in light of the con-
stitutional analysis approach to psychosurgery288
s
The question of substitute consent presents one of the major dilemmas
in psychosurgery regulation. If the approach taken in Kaimowitz is
adopted,2 8 9 and substitute consent is not recognized, patients who are
deemed to be incapable of giving legally adequate consent will be barred
from the surgical procedures. Such a result may be a violation of the pa-
as to the sufficiency of informed consent according to statutory standards-a determination typi-
cally made by juries in malpractice cases-such a limitation may not be required.
282. See OR. REV. STAT. § 426.715(2) (1977).
283. See Id.
284. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 517-18.
285. See note 279 and accompanying text supra.
286. The requirement of unanimity of the medical board of review is imposed by the Califor-
nia legislation, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1978), and was
upheld in Aden. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 683, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 548. See notes 155 & 156 and
accompanying text supra.
287. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.130(b) (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-206d (1975);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5161(a)(2)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3)(b) (Cum.
Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 23 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 122-56.6 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.271(C) (Page Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 426.715(5) (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7708 (1968).
288. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 519. In Kaimowitz, both the patient and his par-
ents signed the consent form. Id. at 511. See note 70 and accompanying text supra. Even
though the parents had agreed to the procedure, the court refused to permit the surgery to take
place. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 519. The court stated:
Equally great problems are found when the involuntarily detained mental patient is
incompetent, and consent is sought from a guardian or parent. Although guardian or
parental consent may be legally adequate when arising out of traditional circumstances, it
is legally ineffective in the psychosurgery situation. The guardian or parent cannot do that
which the patient, absent a guardian, would be legally unable to do.
Id. The Kaimowitz court's determination that third-party or substitute consent is not proper in
the psychosurgery situation has received some support among the commentators. See Gauvey,
Leviton, Shuger & Sykes, Informed and Substitute Consent to Health Care Procedures: A
Proposal for State Legislation, 15 HARv. J. LEGIS. 431, 471-75 (1978); Comment, supra note
79, at 217.
289. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 511. See note 287 supra.
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tient's right to treatment.290 On the other hand, if the Oregon procedure is
accepted, 291 and substitute consent is legally adequate, a review board may
be required to review only the consent of the guardian and may approve a
psychosurgical procedure even if the patient specifically opposes it. Such a
result would be an infringement upon the patient's right to refuse treat-
ment.
292
The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, in its report on psychosurgery, re-
solved this dilemma by preserving both a procedure for substitute consent
and the right of the patient to refuse treatment. 293 Under the Commission's
proposal, psychosurgery on a patient incapable of giving informed consent
may be performed if the patient's guardian has given informed consent, a
court in which the patient has legal representation has approved the
performance of the operation, and the patient does not object to the treat-
ment. 29 The Commission also recommends that substitute consent be re-
viewed with an awareness of the potential for conflict of interest inherent in
such consent 295 and that the consenting guardian not be associated with the
institution where the patient is confined or where the operation is to be
performed. 296 If the substitute consent is given by one who is responsible
for providing for the care of the patient, such consent should also be care-
fully scrutinized for possible conflicts of interest.
297
In light of the conflicting rights involved in the issue of substitute con-
sent to psychosurgery, it is submitted that the compromise position reached
by the Commission is preferable. A procedure for substitute consent is pro-
vided, thereby preserving the patient's right to treatment. Moreover,
psychosurgical procedures cannot be performed over the objections of an
adult mental patient, even following adjudication of incompetence and even
though a legal guardian has consented to the operation.
298
V. CONCLUSION
The legal response to psychosurgery provides us with a glaring example
of the consequence of the failure of the law to keep pace with a rapidly
developing technology. The serious legal issues involved in the performance
290. For a general discussion of the right to treatment, see note 140 supra.
291. OR. REV. STAT. § 426.715(5) (1977). See note 183 supra.
292. For a discussion of the right to refuse treatment, see notes 143 & 151 and accompanying text
supra.
293. REPORT, supra note 6, at 64-67.
294. Id. at 64. See note 232 supra.
295. REPORT, supra note 6, at 66.
296. Id.
297. Id. The probability of such conflicts of interest appears to be especially high under the
Oregon procedure for substitute consent. OR. REV. STAT. § 426.730 (1977). The Oregon statute
provides that the guardian will be appointed according to the following preferences: spouses,
next of kin, personal friends, public guardians, and others. Id. § 426.730(2).
298. REPORT, supra note 6, at 66.
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of psychosurgery were initially ignored. 299  Only a general rise in public
concern prompted a response from the legal community. 30 0 That response,
and the associated attempt to balance a series of conflicting rights, has oc-
curred while psychosurgical technology has continued to advance. Since the
medical status of psychosurgery remains largely unsettled, 30 1 the cor-
responding legal issues are equally undetermined.
Some basic issues have been decided, however. First, it is manifestly
clear that psychosurgery represents more than simply an advancement in
medical technology. The first amendment interests affected by the perform-
ance of psychosurgery indicate a greater need to regulate and review these
procedures than traditional medical procedures. Consequently,
psychosurgery will continue to be regulated. 30 2 Second, the basic nature of
the regulatory schemes are still being established. The focus should continue
to be on the adequacy of the consent given by proposed candidates for
psychosurgical procedures.
While the exact nature of the regulation is still unsettled, perhaps it
should remain so. Technological advances will continue, and the law should
be flexible enough to accommodate those advances. Any attempt to firmly
settle the legal response to psychosurgery will eventually result in a failure
of the regulatory approach. The law in this area must therefore adapt itself
to the medical developments, focusing always on the established rights of
the parties involved, but accommodating new developments within that
basic legal framework.
John P. Kopesky
299. See notes 2-4 and accompanying text supra.
300. See notes 6-15 and accompanying text supra.
301. See note 16 supra.
302. Peters & Lee, supra note 242, at 410.
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